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AN EXERCISE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
CREATIVITY: THE FDA'S ASSERTION
OF JURISDICTION OVER
TOBACCO
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the administrative agency
charged with safeguarding the nation's food and drug supply.1 Like other
executive branch agencies, the FDA executes its mission pursuant to stat-
utory authority provided by Congress.2 The Federal Food, Drug, and
1. The FDA, in various organizational frameworks, has regulated the nation's food
and drug supply since 1906, the year that Congress enacted the Federal Food and Drugs
Act. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed in part
by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 9, § 902(a), 52 Stat.
1040, 1059 (1938); Michael Brannon, Organizing and Reorganizing FDA, in FOOD AND
DRUG LAW 113, 115 (Food and Drug Law Inst. ed., 1991). The FDA finds its roots in the
Bureau of Chemistry, the Department of Agriculture Agency responsible for enforcing the
Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906. Id. Since the FDA's initial organization, it has
grown from an agency with a few hundred employees to an agency with approximately
7000 employees, and has survived nine major reorganizations. Id. Today, the Agency is a
part of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Id. at 113; see infra
notes 18-25 and accompanying text (discussing historical aspects of the FDA's jurisdiction
to regulate drugs and medical devices).
Major expansions of the FDA's regulatory authority tend to follow outrageous industry
practices, public health tragedies, or significant scientific advances. Food industry practices
that led to the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, for example, often resulted in unsafe
or unintended food additives. See C.C. Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs
Legislation, 1 LAW & CorEMP. PROBS. 3, 7-8 (1933) (describing sausages and hamburger
steak that contained boracic acid in amounts approaching five to ten times that of a typical
medical dosage). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 languished in Con-
gress for four years until 1937, when a tragedy involving the drug Elixir Sulfanilamide
claimed at least 73 lives. David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its
Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CoNrTMrP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939).
After the Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy, which animal testing or even a review of the scien-
tific literature could have prevented, Congress granted the FDA authority to approve new
drugs. See id. at 20,40. Finally, expansions of the FDA's authority often follow significant
scientific advances. In enacting the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, for instance,
Congress intended to increase the FDA's authority to regulate the "increasing number of
sophisticated, critically important medical devices [that] are being developed and used in
the United States." S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071.
2. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994)). Although the FDCA is the basis for
much of the FDA's modern regulatory framework, the FDA enforces other statutes. See
21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a) (1995) (delegating authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to
enforce certain statutory functions vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services);
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Cosmetic Act (FDCA or the Act) grants the FDA jurisdiction to regulate
foods, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics.3
Before the FDA may subject a product to its extensive regulatory con-
trols, it first must determine that the product properly falls within its ju-
risdiction.4 This jurisdictional determination requires the FDA to
interpret the definitional provisions of the FDCA.5 Because the FDA
see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 42-43 (authorizing the FDA to appoint a board of tea experts and to
set quality standards for teas); id. §§ 61-64 (authorizing the FDA to regulate imitation
milk products, also known as "filled milk"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 262- 264 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)
(authorizing the FDA to regulate biological products intended for human use, including
vaccines and blood products).
3. See Pub. L. No. 75-717, §§ 201(f)-(i), 52 Stat. 1040, 1040-41 (1938) (defining regu-
lated products) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994)).
4. See Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1983) (ex-
plaining that the FDA has "primary jurisdiction" to determine a product's drug status).
But see Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 801 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that federal district courts and the FDA have concurrent jurisdiction in interpret-
ing the "new drug" definition). The FDA's authority to determine a product's FDCA sta-
tus, prior to judicial review, illustrates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. United States v.
Alcon Labs., 636 F.2d 876, 888-89 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see
PETER B. Hur-r & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 1276-83 (2d ed. 1991)
(providing an overview of the primary jurisdiction doctrine); JAMES T. O'REILLY, 1 FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 13.04, at 13-22 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that the Premo case
closely represents legislative intent). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction serves three im-
portant purposes. Alcon Labs., 636 F.2d at 888-89. First, the doctrine helps to "coor-
dinatle] administrative and judicial machinery." Id. at 888 (quoting Mashpee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 580 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). Second, it
facilitates uniform regulation, because one administrative agency is likely to be more con-
sistent than multiple reviewing courts. Id. Third, it takes advantage of an administrative
agency's technical expertise, such as the FDA's command of constantly evolving technolo-
gies and scientific principles. Id. at 889.
. In this Comment, the term "jurisdiction" refers to the FDA's authority to make the
initial determination that the FDCA applies to a particular product. Additionally, the term
refers to the FDA's authority to categorize a product that is obviously inside the FDA's
ambit. See Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing
Nonmedical "Devices" from Medical "Devices" Under 21 U.S. C. § 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 806, 808 n.13 (1993) (explaining that most FDCA litigation involves product cate-
gorization within the Act rather than the Act's initial application to the product at issue).
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1994) (providing definitions); see also infra notes 26-99 and
accompanying text (reviewing legislative and judicial interpretations of the FDCA's drug
and device definitions).
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possesses broad powers,6 the Agency's assertion of jurisdiction often is
disputed vigorously.7
In its most controversial action in years, the FDA recently added to the
tobacco industry's miseries8 by asserting jurisdiction over nicotine-con-
taining cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.9 This action represented a sig-
nificant change in the FDA's long-standing position that tobacco
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1994) (injunctions); id. § 334 (seizures of foods, drugs, and
cosmetics); id. § 334(g) (detention orders for devices upon inspection and reasonable belief
of adulteration or misbranding); id. §§ 372-374 (inspections); id. § 375 (publicity of judg-
ments, decrees, and court orders rendered under the Act); id. §§ 381-382 (imports and
exports); see also Scott Bass, Enforcement Powers of the Food and Drug Administration, in
FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 61, 67 (noting that the FDCA is unusual because it
permits both criminal and civil penalties for the same violations).
7. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. FDA, 727 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that a
lawsuit challenging FDA drug jurisdiction asserted by regulatory letter was not ripe for
judicial review). Manufacturers may challenge an FDA jurisdictional determination by
seeking a declaratory judgment. See id. at 1 (seeking such judgment). A declaratory judg-
ment, however, is not an available remedy until the FDA has taken a final agency position,
and the manufacturer has exhausted its administrative remedies. 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d)(1)(i)
(1995); see generally 1 O'REILLY, supra note 4, §§ 7.01-.15 (describing civil actions involv-
ing FDA enforcement).
8. See Irene Scharf, Breathe Deeply: The Tort of Smokers' Battery, 32 Hous. L. REV.
615, 616-22 (1995) (summarizing developments affecting the tobacco industry). The
United States Supreme Court recently held that federal tobacco legislation did not pre-
empt all state common law claims brought against tobacco companies. Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,517-20 (1992). Disgruntled former smokers, who are often termi-
nally ill, have sought millions of dollars in damages in unprecedented class action suits
against the tobacco industry. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425,
1434 (E.D. La. 1994) (refusing to dismiss a class action lawsuit on behalf of all persons
addicted to nicotine), class certification granted, in part, 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).
Additionally, at least five states have attempted to hold the tobacco industry liable for
Medicaid costs that are linked to tobacco-related illnesses. See Frank Phillips, State Law-
suit Seeks $1 [Billion]from Tobacco Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20,1995, at 25 (report-
ing lawsuits linked to Medicaid costs in five states). Concerned about the health effects of
environmental tobacco smoke, some states have enacted strict bans on smoking in public
places. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-205 (Supp. 1995) (restricting smoking in
hospitals, nursing homes, health clinics, and physician offices); id. § 24-501 to 505 (restrict-
ing smoking in retail establishments); see also Philip J. Hilts, States Adopt Stringent Smok-
ing Bans. N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1994, at A12 (discussing smoking bans in Maryland and
California). Not to be excluded, many businesses have prohibited smoking also, including
McDonald's. See Christopher J. Farley, The Butt Stops Here, TIME, Apr. 18, 1994, at 58
(noting that McDonald's, the restaurant chain, banned smoking in its 1400 company-
owned restaurants). Smoking is forbidden even in the White House. Id. at 60.
9. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless To-
bacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Pro-
posed Regulations]; Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction
Over Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg.
41,453 (1995) [hereinafter Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction]; see, e.g., Ann Devroy
& John Schwartz, FDA Given Power for Cigarette Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at Al;
Michael K. Frisby & Hilary Stout. Clinton to Declare Nicotine in Cigarettes a Drug that Can
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products 1° do not fall within the Act's reach." Despite this precedent,
the Agency asserted that recent developments have brought tobacco
products within the statutory definitions of "drugs" and "medical de-
vices."' 2 Accordingly, the FDA has proposed regulatory measures ad-
dressing what the Agency considers to be the root of the nation's tobacco
problem: tobacco use by persons under eighteen years of age.' 3
The FDA's desire to regulate tobacco products is understandable. To-
bacco products, which have been associated with cancer, cardiovascular
disease, pulmonary disease, and other disorders,' 4 are said to cause more
than 400,000 deaths each year.' 5 Nevertheless, the FDA's authority to
Be Regulated by FDA, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1995, at Al; Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Pro-
poses Broad Plan to Curb Teen-Age Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at Al.
Not surprisingly, six tobacco manufacturers are challenging the FDA's proposed regula-
tions. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States FDA, No. 2:95CV00691 (M.D.N.C. filed Aug.
10, 1995). In their original complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, the manufactur-
ers-Coyne Beam, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Liggett Group, Inc., Loril-
lard Tobacco Co., Philip Morris Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.-claim that the
FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco violates the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, the FDCA, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the guarantees of free
speech and due process in the United States Constitution. Id. at 2. This Comment focuses
upon the FDA's statutory authority to regulate tobacco products; it does not address the
complex first amendment and due process issues.
10. For the purpose of this Comment, the term "tobacco products" includes only nico-
tine-containing cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over
tobacco products does not include cigars or pipe tobacco. See Analysis Regarding Agency
Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,463-64 (concluding, without reference to cigars or pipe
tobacco, that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products fall within the FDCA's definitions
of drug and device).
11. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(upholding the FDA's refusal to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes).
12. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,482 n.5. The FDA
relied on three recent developments to justify a departure from its position that it lacked
the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. Id. at 41,482. First, the FDA asserted that
since it last evaluated its position, the Surgeon General of the United States and many
major public health organizations have concluded that nicotine is addictive. Id. at 41,482
n.5. Second, the FDA exercised jurisdiction over alternative nicotine delivery systems,
such as nicotine gums and transdermal patches. Id. at 41,482-83 n.5. Third, the FDA as-
serted that it has uncovered evidence indicating that the tobacco industry recognized nico-
tine's addictive properties and acted to facilitate the use of nicotine as an addictive drug.
Id. at 41,483 n.5. Significantly, the FDA relied upon tobacco industry statements and re-
search related to the manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes. Id. at 41,491-520.
13. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, at 41,314; see text accompanying infra notes
193-200 (describing proposed regulations).
14. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. (CDC) 92-
8419, SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS: A 1992 REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN-
ERAL 86 (1992) [hereinafter SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS].
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Cigarette Smoking - At-
tributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost - United States, 1990, 42 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WKLY REP. 645, 645 (1993). Smoking-related illnesses reportedly claim
more lives each year in the United States than AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, homicides,
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regulate tobacco is questionable. 16 After continuously denying its au-
thority to regulate tobacco, is the FDA now in a position to assert tobacco
jurisdiction? Attempting to answer this question in the affirmative, the
FDA-an Agency with a rich history of interpreting the FDCA cre-
atively-has advanced an interpretation of the Act's definitional provi-
sions beyond well-established boundaries.
17
This Comment examines whether the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction
over tobacco exceeds the Agency's statutory authority to regulate drugs
and medical devices. Focusing on the statutory definitions of "drugs" and
"devices," this Comment first reviews the plain language, legislative his-
tory, and judicial constructions of the FDCA's definitional provisions.
Next, this Comment surveys federal tobacco regulation, including the
FDA's limited role in regulating tobacco products. This Comment then
analyzes the FDA's current jurisdictional determination, finding a signifi-
cant departure from existing FDCA standards. This Comment argues
that Congress did not intend the FDA to regulate tobacco products as
"drugs" or "medical devices," absent certain public representations by
tobacco manufacturers. This Comment further argues that the FDA's ju-
risdictional determination is manifestly contrary to the Act's organization
and purpose. This Comment concludes that only Congress can provide a
regulatory framework to deal with the health consequences of tobacco
use.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FDA's DRUG AND DEVICE JURISDICTION
Comprehensive federal authority to regulate drugs and medical devices
is a relatively new development.'" It was not until 1906 that Congress
passed the Federal Food and Drugs Act (1906 Act), the first major legis-
lative effort to provide a comprehensive scheme for federal regulation of
illegal drugs, suicides, and fires combined. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GROWING UP To-
BACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YouTHs 3 (Barbara
S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 1994) [hereinafter GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE].
16. See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text (concluding that the FDA should
regulate tobacco products only with an explicit authorization from Congress).
17. See infra notes 201-46 and accompanying text (analyzing the FDA's jurisdictional
determination).
18. See HuTrr & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 6-10 (discussing 19th century state laws and
scattered federal enactments regulating food and drugs); see also supra note 1 and accom-
panying text (discussing the origin of the FDA). See generally Wallace F. Janssen,
America's First Food and Drug Laws, 30 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 665 (1975).
1996]
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food and drugs.' 9 Although revolutionary at the time of its enactment,2 °
the 1906 Act's reach was limited; rapidly emerging technologies soon re-
vealed its many deficiencies.2 ' Thus, in 1933, New Deal reformers began
the difficult and controversial task of amending the nation's premiere
food and drug statute.22 The five years of vigorous debate that followed
culminated in the passage of the FDCA, the FDA's enabling act and the
basis for much of the Agency's modern regulatory framework.23 The
19. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed in
part by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 9, § 902(a), 52 Stat.
1040, 1059 (1938).
20. See Joel E. Hoffman, The Food and Drug Administration's Administrative Proce-
dures, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 1, 2 (discussing concerns that the 1906
Act would authorize federal intrusion into purely local activities such as food processing
and drug manufacturing). See generally JAMES H. YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE
FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 (1989) (detailing six decades of relevant history
preceding the enactment of the 1906 Act).
21. See CHARLES 0. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEw DEAL 4-
15 (1970) (detailing abusive industry practices that were beyond the reach of the 1906 Act);
Hoffman, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that many regarded the 1906 Act as a failure). One
notable weakness of the 1906 Act was its failure to provide for the regulation of false
advertising. JACKSON, supra, at 5. For example, one vendor promoted a product labeled
"Crazy Crystals" as a cure for colitis, diabetes, and other diseases. Id. at 6. Because the
crystals were actually a simple cathartic that became dangerous with repeated use, the
FDA seized shipments of the product. Id. The vendor, however, was able to avoid federal
regulation by shifting the claims from labeling to other forms of advertising. Id. One such
testimonial advertisement boasted that "Crazy Crystals Pulled Me Out of the Grave." Id.
In addition to its failure to control false advertising, the 1906 Act also failed to reach cos-
metics, medical devices, and drugs intended to affect the structure or function of the body.
H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2, reprinted in 6 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 301 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Further, the 1906 Act did not require premarket testing of
new drugs for safety. Id.
22. The FDCA was considered and enacted during the "New Deal." JACKSON, supra
note 21, at 201-21. The New Deal, spanning the years 1933 to 1938, was characterized by
numerous legislative and executive actions designed to deal with domestic matters, specifi-
cally the Great Depression. Id. at 201; see also Hoffman, supra note 20, at 5-11 (positing
that Congress' distrust of New Deal administrators was one reason for the five-year debate
over the FDCA).
23. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994)). An enabling statute, the foundation
upon which an administrative agency is built, limits an agency's power, so that acts exceed-
ing the scope of the statute are invalid. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining the term "enabling statute" as "any statute enabling . . . agencies to do what
before they could not"). The FDCA is the FDA's enabling statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a)
(1994) (providing authority to the FDA to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforce-
ment of the Act); Bass, supra note 6, at 61 (providing an overview of the FDA's statutory
authorities and enforcement powers). In the FDCA, Congress limited the FDA's power to
act in several ways. First, the FDCA defines the categories of products that the FDA may
properly regulate. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(f), (g), (h), (i) (1994) (defining "food," "drug,"
"device," and "cosmetic"). Second, the FDCA outlines the prohibited acts that trigger
FDA enforcement authority. Id. § 331. Third, the FDCA enumerates the FDA's enforce-
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FDCA delineates the scope of the FDA's drug and device jurisdiction24
and directs the FDA to ensure that drugs and medical devices are reason-
ably safe and effective.25
A. The FDA's Drug Jurisdiction: The Impact of the "Structure or any
Function" Clause
Through its extensive FDCA authorities, the FDA approves new
drugs,26 seizes adulterated drugs, 27 and seeks injunctions, civil penalties,
and criminal sanctions for violations of the Act.28 Not surprisingly, ven-
dors frequently dispute whether a given product is a "drug" within the
ment powers: injunctions, id. § 332, civil and criminal penalties, id. § 333, product seizures,
id. § 334, inspections, id. § 374, and publicity, id. § 375. See also Bass, supra note 6, at 61.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1994) (defining "drug"); id. § 321(h) (defining "device");
Stephen Weitzman, Drug, Device, Cosmetic?-Part 1, 24 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 226, 230-
47 (1969) (delineating, by history, the boundaries and overlap of the FDCA's definitional
provisions).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994) (requiring new drugs to meet safety and efficacy standards);
id. § 360c(a)(2) (requiring devices to meet safety and efficacy standards).
26. Id. § 355; see Hui-r & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 513-37 (providing a comprehen-
sive overview of the drug approval process and related considerations); 1 O'REiLLY, supra
note 4, § 13.11-.19 (same). The FDCA defines a "new drug" as "[a]ny drug.., the compo-
sition of which ... is not. generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific train-
ing and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective
for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
thereof." 21 U.S.C. 321(p)(1) (1994). Except for an extremely narrow class of
"grandfathered drugs," all substances the FDA deems to be "drugs" are also "new drugs"
subject to the FDA's approval process. See 1 O'REILLY, supra note 4, § 13.06, at 13-34
(noting the heavy burden of proof required to obtain grandfather status).
The FDCA prohibits the marketing of new drugs without FDA approval, id. § 355(a), a
process that takes about seven to thirteen years to complete. Hurr & MERRILL, supra
note 4, at 514. The traditional route to obtaining FDA approval of a drug involves three
major stages. Id. In the first stage, preclinical testing, a member of the pharmaceutical
industry examines a compound's chemistry, pharmacology, and toxicology to determine its
potential usefulness in humans. Id. at 514-15. Second, to gain permission to conduct
clinical studies in humans, the drug's sponsor submits the preclinical research data to the
FDA in a "'Claimed Exemption for an Investigational New Drug'" (IND). Id. at 515. If
approved, the IND application permits the sponsor to proceed to clinical testing of the
drug's safety and efficacy in human volunteers. Id. at 514, 516. After three phases of
clinical studies, involving healthy subjects and potentially thousands of patients with the
disease or condition that the drug is designed to treat, a drug's sponsor may choose to file a
new drug application (NDA). See id. at 516 (noting that only ten percent of drugs ob-
taining the IND status will have sufficient merit to warrant a NDA). In the third and final
stage of the drug approval process, the FDA evaluates the NDA, which presents both sum-
maries and raw data relating to the drug's safety and efficacy. Id. at 519. If the drug gains
FDA approval, the FDA releases a "summary of the basis of approval" to the public, id. at
531-32, and imposes various postapproval requirements, such as reports of adverse drug
reactions, id. at 537.
27. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1994).
28. Id. §§ 332-333.
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meaning of the FDCA, and thus subject to FDA jurisdiction.2 9 Of the
four categories of drugs recognized by the FDCA,3 ° 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(g)(1)(C) defines the category that is perhaps most open to creative
interpretation: "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure
or any function of the body of man or other animals. 31
The drafters of § 321(g)(1)(C) intended to expand the definition of
"drug" to bring within the FDA's jurisdiction products that had escaped
regulation under the 1906 Act.32 Concerned about fraudulent weight
control products,33 the drafters found the 1906 Act's definition of "drug"
incomplete because it did not extend beyond products intended to affect
29. See Hurr & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 380 (noting that the product classification
issue is frequently litigated); 1 O'REILLY, supra note 4, § 13.03, at 13-8 (opining that the
drug definition "may be the most litigated definition in the whole realm of [FDA]
regulation").
30. The FDCA provides four definitions of the term "drug":
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official
Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formu-
lary ... and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component of any article
specified in clause (A), (B), or (C).
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1994).
Despite the specific statutory language in § 321(g)(1), courts have found a product's list-
ing in the United States Pharmacopoeia undeterminative of its drug status. See National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 336-38 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusing to find
that vitamins A and D were drugs despite listings in the United States Pharmacopoeia and
the National Formulary). Because the 1890 edition of the United States Homoeopathic
Pharmacopoeia included nicotine, this portion of the drug definition is of some interest to
the tobacco issue. Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 n.6 (1988) (statement of Gregory N. Connolly, D.M.D.,
M.P.H.) (citing a 1984 Report of the Surgeon General). Apparently, nicotine deliberately
was deleted from the Pharmacopoeia to gain votes in favor of the 1906 Act from tobacco
states' legislators. Id. at 158' As the Pharmacopoeia and National Formulary are largely
ignored in the drug classification process, however, nicotine's original listing is merely in-
teresting tobacco trivia.
31. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
32. See H.R. Rep. No. 2139, supra note 21, at 3, reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 302. The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce described the
expanded drug definition:
The definition of drug is expanded to include articles used in the diagnosis of
disease, and articles other than food intended to affect the structure or any func-
tion of the body of man or other animals. These expansions are needed to give
jurisdiction over a great number of drugs which are not amenable to control
under the present law.
Id.
33. See S. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 662 (noting that some obesity cures were worthless and others dangerous
to health); RUTH DEFOREST LAMB, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF HORRORS: THE TRUTH
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disease.34 The drafters thus invoked the "structure or any function" lan-
guage to extend FDA jurisdiction to products intended to affect physio-
logical conditions, such as obesity.35 From the beginning, the definition
of drug turned on the vendor's36 intent; that is, whether a particular ven-
dor intended its product to affect the structure or any function of the
body.37
For the most part, courts interpreting § 321(g)(1)(C) have approved ex-
pansions of the FDA's drug jurisdiction.38 In United States v. An Article
... Sudden Change,39 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a clear liquid lotion was a "drug" within the meaning of
ABOUT FOOD AND DRUGS 5-9 (photo. reprint 1976) (1936) (discussing Marmola, a fraudu-
lent cure for obesity).
34. Federal Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769
(repealed in part by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 9,
§ 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938). The definition of "drug" in the 1906 Act included "all
medicines and preparations recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National
Formulary for internal or external use, and any substance or mixture of substances in-
tended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease of either man or other
animals." Id.
35. See H.R. REP. No. 2139, supra note 21. at 2, reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 301 (explaining that the FDCA would reach drugs intended to affect body
weight). The Committee Report explained that "[dirugs intended for ... remedying un-
derweight or overweight or for otherwise affecting bodily structure or function are sub-
jected to regulation." Id.
36. In discussing the standard of intent under the FDCA, this Comment uses the terms
"vendor" and "manufacturer" interchangeably.
37. S. REP. No. 361, supra note 33, at 4, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 21, at 663. The legislative history links the "intended use" determination to the manu-
facturer's representations, including labeling and advertising, in connection with the sale of
the product. Id.; see also Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that jurisdiction is established by the vendor's intended use, not the product's
composition).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. "8" & "49", 777 F.2d
1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that product advertisements suggesting that the product
was similar to cocaine established statutory intent), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987);
Schweiker, 713 F.2d at 339 (holding that a starch blocker intended to prevent the absorp-
tion of calories from starchy foods was a § 321(g)(1)(C) drug); United States v. An Article
.. . "Line Away Temporary Wrinkle Smoother, Coty", 415 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1969)
(holding that promotional materials depicting-a product as an "amazing protein lotion"
made in a "pharmaceutical laboratory" established statutory intent); United States v. Kasz
Enters., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 534, 540 (D.R.I.) (holding that hair care products intended to
make hair thicker were drugs because hair growth is a bodily function), amended on other
grounds, 862 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I. 1994); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of
"Cal-Ban 3000", 776 F. Supp. 249, 255 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that a product marketed
as a weight reduction aid was a drug). But see United States v. An Article... "Magic
Secret", 331 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D. Md. 1971) (holding that a vendor's claim that its lotion
was a "pure protein" resulting in an "astringent sensation" did not establish an intent to
affect the structure or any function of the body).
39. 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the FDCA.4 ° The manufacturer's advertisements in Sudden Change
claimed that the lotion, comprising mostly distilled water and bovine al-
bumin, provided a "face lift without surgery."'" Invoking the rule that
the manufacturer's intended use determines the product's status as a drug
under the FDCA, the Second Circuit noted that any relevant source, in-
cluding the product label, advertising, and promotional materials may de-
termine intended use.4 2 Further, to guide its evaluation of product
claims, the Second Circuit applied a standard to determine whether "the
ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous" individual would believe
that the product would affect a bodily structure or function. 3 Reasoning
that the vendor's references to "face lift" and "surgery" implied that the
lotion could affect the structure of the body beyond merely altering an
individual's appearance temporarily, the court concluded that the lotion
was a drug under § 321(g)(1)(C). 4
The Sudden Change court, relying in part on the manufacturer's claim
of a "face lift without surgery," focused on intent to affect the structure of
the body.45 Similarly, in United States v. Undetermined Quantities ...
"Pets Smellfree",4 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit focused on the manufacturer's intent to affect a function of the
body-digestion.4 7 Advertisements for Pets Smellfree, a food additive
for animals, claimed that the product would eliminate pet odors related
to feces, urine, gas, and bad breath 8.4  Because Pets Smellfree purported
to reduce intestinal bacteria, thus affecting the function of digestion, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that Pets Smellfree was a drug under
§ 321(g)(1)(C).4 9
Although a literal reading of the FDCA's "structure or any function"
language would permit or even compel FDA jurisdiction over numerous
articles, some courts have read this language narrowly. In one notable
40. Id. at 742.
41. Id. at 737. The claims accompanying the lotion were essential to its drug status.
Id. at 739. Consequently, the court explained that the lotion would cease to be a drug
within the meaning of § 321(g)(1)(C) once the manufacturer retracted the promotional
claims. Id. at 742.
42. Id. at 739.
43. Id. at 740 (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir
1910).
44. Id. at 742.
45. Id. at 741.
46. 22 F.3d 235 (10th Cir. 1994).
47. Id. at 240.
48. Id. at 236. The Tenth Circuit noted that normal intestinal bacteria cause such pet
odors, and Pets Smellfree reduced odors by reducing the number of bacteria in the
animal's digestive system and oral cavities. Id. at 240.
49. Id
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case, Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris,50 the District of Columbia
Circuit deferred to the FDA's refusal to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes
as a § 321(g)(1)(C) drug.5 1 In Action on Smoking and Health, fourteen
organizations and individuals filed a citizen's petition5 2 requesting that
the FDA assert jurisdiction over cigarettes.5 3 When the FDA refused to
assert jurisdiction, a citizen group, Action on Smoking and Health,
brought suit to compel the FDA to assert jurisdiction. 4 In evaluating the
FDA's inaction, the court first examined whether cigarette vendors pos-
sessed the statutory intent.55 Because the record completely lacked evi-
dence of the vendors' intent, 6 the court concluded that Action on
Smoking and Health failed to meet its burden of proving that tobacco
vendors intended cigarettes to affect the "structure or any function" of
the body.57 Further, the court rejected as overly broad a literal interpre-
50. 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 237-38 (stating "the [FDA's] construction and application of [§ 321(g)(1)(C)]
is entitled to substantial deference"). The District of Columbia Circuit did not address the
issue of cigarettes as "medical devices" under the FDCA. Id. at 237 n.4.
52. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994) (providing that the
public may petition administrative agencies to adopt or to alter rules); 1 'RELLY, supra
note 4, § 4.16, at 4-46 to 4-49 (providing an overview of the citizen's petition under the
FDCA). While anyone may petition the FDA to issue, amend, or repeal regulations, the
FDCA also provides for petitions under particular circumstances. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)
(1994) (food additives); id. § 355(b)(1) (new drug applications); id. § 371(e) (miscellaneous
provisions); id. § 376 (seafood inspections). Further, parties wishing to file lawsuits de-
manding FDA action on a particular subject must file the appropriate petition first. 21
C.F.R. § 10.45(a)-(c) (1995); see 1 'REILLY, supra note 4, § 4.16, at 4-47.
53. Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 237.
54. Id The FDA argued successfully that agency jurisdiction must be predicated upon
the vendor's representations about the product. Id. at 239-41. Absent health claims from
cigarette vendors, the FDA consistently had refused to assert regulatory jurisdiction over
cigarettes. Id. at 239. Further, the Agency asserted that FDA jurisdiction could not be
based upon evidence of a serious health hazard. Id.
55. Id. at 238-41.
56. Id. at 239. The court noted that Action on Smoking and Health had failed to pro-
duce subjective evidence regarding the intent of cigarette vendors, such as vendor claims.
Id. Additionally, the citizens' group had failed to produce objective evidence of vendor
intent, such as labeling, promotional materials, and advertising. Id.
57. Id. at 240. Action on Smoking and Health argued that consumers use cigarettes to
affect a structure or function of the body, and that such consumer use established the req-
uisite vendor intent. Id. at 239. The court rejected this argument, but left open the possi-
bility that consumer use alone could establish vendor intent. Id. For consumer use to be a
relevant source for determining vendor intent, the evidence would have to be strong
enough to justify an inference that the vendor intended the particular consumer use. Id.
Although Action on Smoking and Health did not meet this "substantial showing," the court
concluded that evidence that consumers use cigarettes "nearly exclusively" to affect a bod-
ily structure or function would establish the requisite vendor intent. Id. at 239-40. Thus, a
successful showing of the "nearly exclusively" standard of consumer use would render ciga-
rettes a drug under the FDCA. Id. at 240.
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tation of the "structure or any function" language. 58 Given this narrow
reading, § 321(g)(1)(C) will not apply where a product is intended to af-
fect an insignificant or remote physical function of the body. 59
B. From Rags to Riches: The FDA's Medical Device Jurisdiction
1. The Drug-Device Distinction and its Influence on the Scope of
Regulation
Although the 1906 Act did not authorize the regulation of devices,6°
fraudulently promoted or "quack" devices became an increasingly com-
The factual threshold required to demonstrate the "nearly exclusively" standard of con-
sumer use remains obscure because no court after Action on Smoking and Health has re-
lied on that standard to infer vendor intent solely by consumer use. Indeed, at least one
decision considering evidence of consumer use has been similarly unclear about the re-
quired showing. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334-36
(2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting, based upon the facts, consumer use as indicative of vendor intent
to produce vitamin products for drug purposes). In National Nutritional Foods Ass'n, the
Second Circuit considered whether high-dosage vitamin supplements were drugs within the
meaning of the FDCA. Id. at 329. The court focused on § 321(g)(1)(B), which requires a
showing of vendor intent that is analogous to § 321(g)(1)(C). See id. at 333-34 (discussing
the elements of a product's drug status under § 321(g)(1)(B), and citing United States v.
An Article... "Sudden Change," 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir. 1969) for support). The FDA,
noting that medical and popular literature widely promoted therapeutic uses of high dos-
age vitamins, argued that consumer use of the vitamin supplements for drug purposes sig-
nificantly outweighed other, nondrug purposes. Id. at 334-36. The court, however,
rejected this argument. Id. at 336. The FDA had produced no evidence to show that at the
specified levels of potency, the "vitamins were taken 'almost exclusively' for therapeutic
purposes." Id. Rather, comments submitted to the FDA indicated that many people be-
lieved a wide range of dosages were therapeutically useful, and others ingested vitamins
solely to supplement their daily diet. Id. Thus, while some sort of affirmative showing is
required to allow an inference of vendor intent based on consumer use alone, the parame-
ters of the required showing remain unclear.
58. Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 240. The District of Columbia Circuit
clearly limited the reach of § 321(g)(1)(C):
Anything which stimulates any of the senses may be said, in some perhaps insig-
nificant degree, to affect the functions of the body of man. Consequently any
article which, used in the manner anticipated by the manufacturer thereof, comes
into contact with any of the senses may be said to be an article "intended to affect
the functions of the body of man ....
Surely, the legislators did not mean to be as all-inclusive as a literal interpreta-
tion of this clause would compel us to be.
Id. (quoting FTC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
aff'd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953)).
59. See E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(confining the "structure or function" definitions to products that claim literally to change
the physical structure of the body or to alter its basic functions).
60. H.R. REP. No. 2139, supra note 21, at 3, reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 302; see Weitzman, supra note 24, at 230-46 (reviewing the legislative
history of the FDCA definitional provisions). See generally Peter B. Hutt, A History of
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mon problem in the 1930s. 6' Thus, when Congress enacted the FDCA,
early drafts attempted to bring devices within the statutory definition of
"drug."'62 Colorful debates on the Senate floor revealed the controversial
nature of this approach.63 Senator Clark, an outspoken critic of the ex-
pansive definition, contended that by classifying a mechanical device,
such as a shoulder brace, as a drug, Congress would be enacting bad legis-
lation.' In response to these criticisms, Senator Copeland proposed an
amendment containing a separate, although parallel, definition of device;
Congress later approved this amendment without further debate. 65 The
debate between Senator Clark and Senator Copeland foreshadowed,
however, the confusion that would continue to cloud the drug-device
distinction.66
Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 99 (1989) (providing an overview of medical device regulation).
61. See LAMB, supra note 33, at 132 (exposing fraudulent devices of the 1930s). Inef-
fective and dangerous devices thrived under the 1906 Act. Id. Fraudulent devices mar-
keted during that period included nose straighteners, eyeball exercisers, whistles for
developing weak lungs, height-stretching machines, and heated rubber applicators mar-
keted as cures for prostate gland disorders. Id.
62. S. REP. No. 361, supra note 33, at 3, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 21, at 662.
63. See 79 CONG. REC. 4840-51 (1935), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 21, at 796-807 (setting forth a 1935 debate between Senators Copeland and Clark
regarding the device definition in S. 5).
64. 79 Cong. Rec. 4841, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 797.
Senator Clark criticized the definition as a "palpable absurdity" that was irreconcilable
with the common meaning of the term device. Id. In Senator Clark's view, the effect of
the illogical definition was "the same thing as if the Congress of the United States should
attempt to say by law that calling a sheep's tail a leg would make it a leg." Id.
65. See Weitzman, supra note 24, at 237-38 (noting that the committee's revision of the
device definition was in part a result of Senator Clark's objections). Under the FDCA. the
terms "drug" and "device" are defined in a parallel manner:
The term "device" ... means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including
any component, part, or accessory, which is-
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopoeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chem-
ical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not depen-
dent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994); see id. § 321(g)(1) (defining the term "drug").
66. See infra notes 67-99 and accompanying text (discussing major developments in
the FDA's device jurisdiction).
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Technological advancements in the 1960s resulted in many products
that fell into a legal grey area between "drugs" and "devices.",67 Because
the FDA's authority to regulate drugs was significantly broader than its
authority to regulate devices, the FDA used this legal grey area to classify
many products with device characteristics as "drugs., 68 This FDA prac-
tice of stretching 69 the drug definition led to two influential decisions:
AMP, Inc. v. Gardner7" and United States v. An Article of Drug.. . Bacto-
Unidisk. 1  In AMP, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that surgical blood vessel loops and clamps, products in-
tended to reconnect severed blood vessels, were drugs and not devices.72
In making this seemingly awkward ruling, the Second Circuit noted first
that, except for the FDA's premarket approval authority over drugs, the
distinction between "drugs" and "devices" was insignificant.73 Accord-
ingly, the court reasoned that products should be classified with reference
to Congress' purpose in enacting the premarket approval provisions of
the Act: the prevention of inadequately tested medical products from en-
tering interstate commerce.74 Despite the obvious mechanical nature of
these products, the Second Circuit found that they presented many of the
same threats to public health as "drugs" and thus should be regulated as
drugs.75
67. See S. REP. No. 33, supra note 1, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1087
(noting the confusion surrounding the definitions of "drugs" and "devices"). Examples of
sophisticated products that did not fall neatly into either the drug or the device category
included implants and in vitro diagnostic products. Id. The Medical Device Amendments
of 1976 added such products to the definition of "device," thus clarifying a confusing issue.
Id.
68. Prior to 1976, the premarket approval power was the most significant difference
separating the FDA's drug authorities from the device authorities. Rodney R. Munsey &
Howard M. Holstein, Medical Device Regulation, In Transition, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW,
supra note 1, at 371, 372. The lack of advance approval power forced the FDA to control
devices through post facto regulation, namely by bringing enforcement actions in court.
Id. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 provided premarket approval authority for
devices as well as drugs to remedy this power imbalance. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)
(authority to approve new drugs) with 21 U.S.C § 360e (1994) (authority to approve new
devices).
69. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 28-29 (detailing FDA's history of obtaining in-
creased authority through reinterpretation of definitional provisions.)
70. 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968).
71. 394 U.S. 784 (1969).
72. AMP, 389 F.2d at 830.
73. Id. at 829 (relying on legislative history).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 830. The Second Circuit limited "devices" to items Congress intended ex-
pressly to regulate as devices. Id.
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Similarly, in Bacto-Unidisk, the United States Supreme Court held that
a paper disc containing antibiotics was a § 321(g)(1)(B) drug.76 Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, noted the 1935 Senate floor de-
bate concerning the scope of the term "drug," and found that the distinc-
tion between drugs and devices was semantical.77 Relying on this
semantical distinction, coupled with the FDCA's remedial purpose, the
Bacto-Unidisk Court read the definition of "drug" broadly, and upheld
the FDA's contention that the cardboard disks were classified properly as
"drugs" under the Act.78 Commentators criticized AMP and Bacto-Uni-
disk sharply as "judicial legislation, '" 9 and both decisions helped to bring
about the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.80
2. Expanded Powers: The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 and
The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 ushered in the modern era
of medical device regulation.81 This legislation represented a compro-
mise between the regulated industry, the FDA, and Congress: the regu-
lated industry wanted clarified regulations that would not stifle
development;82 the FDA wanted expanded regulatory powers without
resorting to illogical interpretations of FDCA definitions;83 and Congress
76. United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799-800
(1969).
77. Id. at 797-98. The Court listed several products for which a drug classification
would have been absurd, and concluded that Congress added a separate device definition
merely to avoid incongruous results. Id. at 796. For example, the legislative history listed
the following products as demonstrative of the potential absurdity of a single definition:
shoulder braces, crutches, radium belts, electrical devices, bathroom weight scales, and
hospital air conditioners. Id.
78. Id. at 799-800.
79. See Vincent A. Kleinfeld, Surgical Implants: Drugs or Devices, and New Device
Legislation, 23 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510, 518 (1968) (stating that the AMP court based
its product classification on policy and not legal justifications, and that the products at issue
were "clearly devices"); Joseph R. Radzius, Medical Devices and Judicial Legislation, 27
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 639, 642-43 (1972) (citing AMP as an "excellent example of judi-
cial legislation"); Stephen Weitzman, Drug, Device, Cosmetic?-Part H, 24 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 320, 341 (1969) (examining AMP and Bacto-Unidisk and concluding that "[nlo
doubt there may be concern for better consumer protection, but it is for Congress, not the
courts, to legislate").
80. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.); see S. REP. No. 33, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1075
(citing AMP and Bacto-Unidisk as demonstrative of the confusion surrounding the drug/
device distinction).
81. 1 O'REILLY, supra note 4, § 18.01, at 18-1 to 18-2.
82. Id. at 18-7 n.42.
83. Id. at 18-6 to 18-7.
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wanted to ensure public safety and product development while prevent-
ing excessive expansion of the FDA's device jurisdiction.84
The Medical Device Amendments, an extremely complex piece of leg-
islation, effected two significant changes in the FDA's device jurisdic-
tion.85 First, the Amendments clarified the definition of "device,"
carefully distinguishing "device" from "drug."86 Second, even if a prod-
uct properly is regulated as a device, the Amendments required the FDA
to classify the device into one of three groups, each of which is subject to
varying regulatory authority.87 The classification requirement epitomized
84. Id. at 18-7. Congress repeatedly has expressed concern about the FDA's ability to
expand its jurisdiction arbitrarily. 79 CONG. REC., supra note 63, at 4841, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 797 (statement of Sen. Clark). Prior to the pas-
sage of the FDCA, Senator Clark of Missouri opined that "[tihe language .... in the bill is
broad enough to cover any device of which the [FDA] chooses to take jurisdiction." Id. A
similar concern surfaced during the debate preceding the Medical Device Amendments of
1976, when one representative remarked that "this classification of devices pretty well in-
cludes everything, or well nigh everything in creation." 122 CONG. REc. 5851 (1976) (state-
ment of Rep. Collins). The Medical Device Amendments, however, reflected these
concerns about the FDA's regulatory zeal: "[Tihis body quite understandably is suspicious
of regulatory legislation. But there need be no concern over this conference report. It has
been carefully designed so that the least regulation necessary to assure safety and effective-
ness will be applied to devices." 122 CONG. REC. 13,778 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rogers,
Chairman of the Health and Environment Subcommittee). Thus, Congress designed the
Amendments specifically to authorize FDA regulation in proportion to the public health
risk. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the medical device classification
system, the framework that allows the FDA to vary the extent of regulation in proportion
to the risk presented to the public health).
85. A complete discussion of the Medical Device Amendments is beyond the scope of
this Comment. For more detailed information, see generally THE FOOD AND DRUG LAW
INSTITUTE, AN ANALYTICAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMEND-
MENTS OF 1976 (Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. & Robert A. Spiegel eds., 1976) (organizing the
legislative history according to specific subsections of the Amendments); Munsey & Hol-
stein, supra note 68 (setting forth the history of the Amendments and the resulting regula-
tory schemes).
86. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 539, 575
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994)). Retaining much of the drug-device
distinction first promulgated in 1976, the FDCA currently provides two important distinc-
tions between drugs and devices. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3). First, unlike a drug, a device
cannot "achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the
body." Id. Second, a device must not be "dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of its primary intended purposes." Id. The Medical Device Amendments
provided mutually exclusive definitions of "drug" and "device"; however, the Safe Medical
Device Act of 1990 eliminated this distinction by recognizing drug-device combination
products. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, § 16, 104 Stat. 4511, 4526; see infra notes 92-
93 and accompanying text (describing the FDA's authority to regulate products as drug-
device combinations).
87. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 539, 540-41
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The Amendments designated the
groups as Class I, General Controls; Class II, Performance Standards; and Class III,
Premarket Approval. Id.
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the spirit of the legislation, which sought to correlate the amount of de-
vice regulation with the health risks and benefits of each device.88
Although the regulated industry, Congress, and the FDA supported
the Medical Device Amendments enthusiastically, the law's complexity
caused implementation problems.89 In response, Congress enacted the
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (SMDA).9° The SMDA, known pri-
marily for strengthening and streamlining the Medical Device Amend-
ments, also affected the FDA's device jurisdiction.9 In the SMDA,
Congress recognized drug-device combination products for the first
time." Thus, after 1990, the FDA enjoyed increased flexibility in regulat-
ing products with characteristics of both drugs and devices, such as pre-
filled syringes or surgical scrub brushes impregnated with antimicrobial
agents.93
88. Munsey & Holstein, supra note 68, at 378. The device classification system also is
known as the "tiered system of regulation." Id. Class I devices require the least amount of
regulation to ensure safety and effectiveness, thus, the general FDCA controls relating to
the prevention of adulteration, misbranding, and similar concerns will suffice. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(A) (1994). Examples of Class I devices include cholesterol testing systems, 21
C.F.R. § 862.1175 (1995), microscopes, id. § 864.3600, and some surgical instruments, such
as forceps, id. § 870.4500. For Class II devices, the general FDCA controls will not ensure
safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1994). Rather, the FDA must estab-
lish performance standards, with the help of independent advisory panels, to protect the
public health adequately. Id. § 360c(b)(1). Devices in Class II include portable oxygen
generators, 21 C.F.R. § 868.5440 (1995), and blood gas monitors used in open heart sur-
geries, id. § 870.4330. Finally, Class III devices are those that present the most significant
risks to public health. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1994). For these devices, the FDA re-
quires premarket approval. Id. Class III devices include life-support systems, 21 C.F.R.
§ 860.93 (1995), and certain cancer detection tests, id. § 866.6010.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6306. The House Report stated that FDA interpretation of the
Amendments and limited resources also contributed to the implementation problems. Id.
90. Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.).
91. See id. § 16, 104 Stat. at 4526 (affecting the FDA's device jurisdiction by allowing
combination devices and by clarifying the device definition); see also infra note 93 (discuss-
ing the jurisdictional disputes concerning combination devices that have arisen within the
FDA).
92. § 16, 104 Stat. at 4526. The FDA's regulations define "combination product" as a
"product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e., drug/device, biologic/de-
vice, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that are physically, chemically, or otherwise
combined or mixed and produced as a single entity." 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e)(1) (1995). The
FDA's current tobacco analysis classifies cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as "combination
products." See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (describing the FDA's classifica-
tion of tobacco products).
93. See FDA, INTERCENTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALU-
ATION AND RESEARCH AND THE CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
(Oct. 31, 1991), reprinted in 3 Food & Drug L. Rep. (FDLI) No. 2, at supp. 44 (Feb. 1992)
(outlining possible regulatory schemes) [hereinafter INTERCENTER AGREEMENT]. Within
the FDA, specialized offices or "Centers," such as the Center for Drug Evaluation and
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3. Terse Judicial Interpretations of 21 U. S.C. § 321(h) (3)
Relatively few federal courts have interpreted the "structure or any
function" language of § 321(h)(3).94 Moreover, the few decisions that do
exist provide little interpretive guidance beyond merely stating the fea-
tures needed to render the product a "device" under § 321(h)(3). Never-
theless, one case demonstrates the breadth of this language aptly: United
States v. 23 Articles [. .. Time to Sleep]. 95
In Time to Sleep, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a phonograph record promoted as a cure for insomnia
was a device within the meaning of § 321(h)(3). 6 As a preliminary mat-
ter, the Second Circuit found that a phonograph record, consistent with
the statutory language, was a contrivance.97 The Second Circuit noted
Research (Drug Center), regulate the various categories of products. 21 C.F.R. § 5.100
(1995) (outlining the central organization of the FDA). After the SMDA, the FDA issued
detailed procedures for determining which Centers would regulate certain types of combi-
nation products. Id. § 3.1. For example, the Drug Center possesses primary jurisdiction to
regulate devices that serve a primary purpose of drug delivery, and that are distributed
containing a drug. See INTERCENTER AGREEMENT, supra, at 6, 14 (describing the "pre-
filled drug delivery system," such as nebulizers, pre-filled syringes, and transdermal
patches). This approach is consistent with the explicit intent of the SMDA. which provided
that combination products should be regulated as drugs if their "primary mode of action"
was that of a drug. § 16(a), 104 Stat. at 4526 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (1994)). De-
spite the clear language of the SMDA and the Intercenter Agreement, however, jurisdic-
tional disputes concerning combination products persist among the FDA's Centers.
Munsey & Holstein, supra note 68, at 382.
94. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding
that a surgical nail was intended to affect structure of body); United States v. 23 Articles
[... Time to Sleep], 192 F.2d 308, 309 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that phonographic records
were intended to affect sleep, a function of the body).
95. 192 F.2d 308 (2d. Cir. 1951). In Time to Sleep, the court faced two issues. Id.
First, the court addressed whether a phonographic record could be a "device" within the
meaning of § 321(h). Id. Answering the first inquiry in the affirmative, the court ad-
dressed whether the records were "misbranded" within the meaning of § 352(a). Id. The
FDCA's provisions regarding whether a drug or device is "misbranded" present an issue
distinct from the issue of initial classification. As such, these provisions are beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a review of the "misbranding" provisions, see 1 O'REILLY,
supra note 4, §§ 15.01-.16, at 15-1 to 15-40 (reviewing the misbranding provisions for drugs
under the FDCA); Hutt, supra note 60 (providing a history of misbranded devices).
96. Time to Sleep, 192 F.2d at 309. The court based its holding on the vendor's in-
tended use for the records, as evidenced by the promotional materials. Id. The promo-
tional materials presented claims such as "De Luxe Records Presents Time To Sleep a
Tested Method of Inducing Sleep." Id. In addition, the promotional materials included a
certificate entitled "Sleep Guaranteed." Id.
The current § 321(h)(3) was designated formerly as § 321(h)(2). The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(h), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (1938) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994)).
97. Time to Sleep, 192 F.2d at 309; see supra note 65 (providing the FDCA's definition
of "device," which includes contrivances marketed with the statutory intent). Classifying a
product as a "contrivance", however, is hardly illuminating. Some definitions of "contri-
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that expert testimony unanimously indicated that sleep is a function of
the body.98 Relying on this expert testimony, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the record fell within the statutory definition of "device" be-
cause it was intended to affect sleep, a function of the body.99
C. Judicial Review of FDA Decisions
Disputes about FDA jurisdiction frequently lead to judicial review of
FDA interpretations of the FDCA. Throughout decisions reviewing the
Agency's interpretations, two themes persist: the need to construe reme-
dial legislation broadly,1"' and the applicability of the framework the
Supreme Court established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. 1 '
1. Remedial Legislation
The FDCA is an example of remedial legislation.1 2 Congress designed
the Act specifically to authorize the FDA to promulgate regulations in
vance" provide merely that it is a "mechanical device." See AMP, Inc. v. Gardner, 389
F.2d 825, 827 n.5 (2d Cir.) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY
(1963)), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968). A more helpful definition is "[an instrument or
article designed to accomplish a specific objective and made by use of measure of ingenu-
ity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (6th ed. 1990).
98. Time to Sleep, 192 F.2d at 309. The court also considered whether the records
might fall within § 321(h)(2), devices intended to treat or cure disease. Id. The court con-
cluded, however, that expert testimony at the trial indicated that insomnia is not a disease,
although it might be a symptom of a disease or an emotional disturbance. Id.
99. Id.
100. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (citing examples of judicial deference
resulting from the remedial nature of the FDA's mission).
101. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974,
980-81 (1986) (resting on Chevron's second prong); United States v. Undetermined Quan-
tities... "Pets Smellfree", 22 F.3d 235, 238 (10th Cir. 1994) (relying implicitly on Chev-
ron's second prong); United States v. An Article of Device... "Sensor Pad", 942 F.2d
1179, 1181-83 (7th Cir. 1991) (arguing that either prong of Chevron would support a deter-
mination that the product was a device); E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d
678, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying on Chevron's second prong); United States v. 22
Rectangular or Cylindrical Finished Devices... "Ster-o-lizer MD-200", 714 F. Supp. 1159,
1166 (D. Utah 1989) (resting on Chevron's second prong). But see United States v. Kasz
Enters., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 534, 539-40 (D.R.I.) (holding that a hair care product was a
"drug" without reference to Chevron), amended on other grounds, 862 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.
1994); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of "Cal-Ban 3000", 776 F. Supp. 249, 255
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that a supplement intended to block starch digestion is a drug
without reference to Chevron).
102. See BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 1293 (6th ed. 1990) (defining remedial laws or stat-
utes). A remedial statute is "[t]hat which is designed to correct an existing law, redress an
existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good." Id.
1010 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:991
the public interest.10 3 Not surprisingly, the Agency's mission to protect
the public health entitles FDA decisions to a considerable amount of judi-
cial deference."° Such deference often results in broad readings of
FDCA provisions, including product definitions.105 Accordingly, despite
occasional setbacks,0 6 the Agency is a tremendously successful
litigant. 107
103. See S. REP. No. 361, supra note 33, at 2, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 661 (explaining that the FDCA was intended "to safeguard the public
health and to promote honesty and fair dealing").
104. See Nancy L. Buc & Deborah F. Neipris, The Food and Drug Administration and
the Supreme Court, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 93, 94 (noting that the
United States Supreme Court has been hospitable to expansive applications of the Act);
see also Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. at 981-82 (allowing the FDA to decide
whether to set tolerance levels for certain harmful substances in foods); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (holding that the FDA's refusal to undertake an enforcement
action was unreviewable); United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 459 (1983)
(upholding an FDA interpretation that the term "drug" included inactive as well as active
ingredients); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54, 559 (1979) (refusing to
enjoin the FDA from imposing safety and efficacy requirements on a drug intended for use
with terminal patients); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676 (1975) (interpreting the
Act to impose a duty to prevent, as well as remedy, violations); United States v. An Article
of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 791-92 (1969) (deferring to the FDA's determina-
tion that a cardboard disk containing antibiotics was a "drug"); Kordel v. United States,
335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948) (extending "labeling" to include any materials used in distribution
and sale, despite lack of physical connection to product); United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S.
432, 438 (1947) (allowing the FDCA to reach an intrastate shipment of goods, provided
that the recipient engaged in interstate commerce); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 281-82 (1943) (approving a rule of strict criminal liability for corporate officers). In
Dotterwich, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, justified a broad reading by refer-
ence to the Act's purpose to protect the consumer:
The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of people
which, in the circumstances of modem industrialism, are largely beyond self-pro-
tection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the legislation if
it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a
collection of English words.
Id. at 280.
105. See Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 798. In Bacto-Unidisk, Chief Justice Warren, writ-
ing for the majority, gave the FDCA a broad reading: "[W]e must give effect to congres-
sional intent in view of the well-accepted principle that remedial legislation such as the
[FDCA] is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the Act's overriding purpose
to protect the public health." Id.
106. See, e.g., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 336 (2d Cir.
1977) (rejecting the FDA's attempt to classify high dosage vitamins as drugs); United
States v. An Article of Drug... "OVA II", 414 F. Supp. 660, 664-65 (D.N.J. 1975) (refus-
ing to defer to the FDA's classification of a home pregnancy test as a "drug"), aff'd without
op., 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. An Article of Drug... "Helene Curtis
Magic Secret", 331 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D. Md. 1971) (holding that a lotion was not a drug
despite its advertisements).
107. See 1 O'REILLY, supra note 4, § 7.01, at 7-2 (noting that litigants opposing the
FDA are at "an extreme disadvantage"); see also supra notes 104-05 (discussing judicial
deference and the resulting broad readings of the Act).
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2. The Chevron Framework
The most significant guidance for courts reviewing an agency's inter-
pretation of its organic statute is the framework the Court announced in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.10 8 In
Chevron, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the term "stationary source"
in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.109 The EPA construed the
term broadly, permitting states to treat pollution-emitting devices within
one industrial grouping as one source of pollution, as opposed to requir-
ing states to treat each individual device as one source."' The Court held
that the EPA's interpretation of the term was a permissible construction
of the statute."1
108. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron is a landmark case provoking volumes of scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986) (arguing that administrative law is too complex to reduce
judicial review to a "simple verbal formula"); Clark Byse, Judicial Review Of Administra-
tive Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 255-
56 (1988) (questioning the second prong of Chevron); Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal
Courts Defer to Agency Interpretation of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis of Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1275, 1298-99 (finding
that Chevron merely provides a flexible guide for federal courts to apply when reviewing
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,512 (noting that, with respect to
Chevron, the Supreme Court is sharply divided as to the amount of deference that should
be afforded in disputes involving questions of law); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The
Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 823 (1990) (positing that Chev-
ron is significant because it recognizes the comparative institutional advantage that admin-
istrative agencies have over the judiciary in interpreting ambiguous statutes); Kenneth W.
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) (finding
Chevron significant because it "narrowed the ambit of judicial review of complex regula-
tory issues"); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2091-105 (1990) (examining the reach of the Chevron principle and how that
principle relates to other rules of statutory construction).
109. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted that
in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (Amendments),
Congress attempted to improve the nation's air quality by imposing strict requirements on
states that did not attain defined air quality goals. Id. The legislation required those
"nonattainment" states to meet stringent conditions prior to adding or modifying a "statio-
nary source", which is a pollution-emitting device. Id. at 840. The EPA permitted the
nonattainment states to adopt a plantwide definition of "stationary source," thus treating
pollution-emitting devices within one industrial grouping as one source of pollution. Id.
Under the EPA regulations, an existing plant was able to add or modify equipment without
meeting the stringent standards that the Amendments imposed, so long as the alteration
did not increase the plant's total emissions. Id. The National Resources Defense Council
asserted that the EPA based its regulations on an impermissible interpretation of the term
"stationary source," and challenged the EPA regulations. Id. at 840-41.
110. Id. at 840.
111. Id. at 866.
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In order to analyze the EPA's interpretation of the statute, the Court
adopted a two-pronged standard for judicial review of an agency's con-
struction of its enabling statute.'1 2 First, a reviewing court must ask
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at is-
sue."'113 If congressional intent is clear, the court need not address the
second prong; the court and the agency must defer to Congress' unam-
biguously expressed intent. 114 However, if congressional intent is ambig-
uous, the court must confront the second prong of the Chevron analysis:
whether the agency's construction of the statute is permissible.115 Under
the second prong of the Chevron framework, an agency's construction of
its enabling statute is "permissible" so long as the construction is a "rea-
sonable" interpretation of the statutory language." 6 Thus, the Chevron
framework, or at least the second prong, affords maximum deference to
an agency's interpretation of its enabling statute." 7
II. THE INTRICATE WEB OF FEDERAL TOBACCO REGULATION
A. Federal Regulatory Schemes for Tobacco Advertising and Labeling
Several federal agencies subject tobacco, at all stages of production, to
considerable regulation. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
112. Id. at 842-43. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Prece-
dent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 976 (1992) (asserting that the Chevron Court may have believed
its two-pronged test did not deviate from Supreme Court precedent, but merely restated
the prior law).
113. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
114. Id. at 842-43.
115. Id. at 843.
116. Id. at 843-44. Chevron and its progeny provide little guidance for determining
when agency interpretations will be "reasonable." Sunstein, supra note 108, at 2104. In-
deed, Professor Merrill notes that most of the cases rejecting the agency's interpretation
have turned on Chevron's first prong, whether Congress has spoken on the precise ques-
tion at issue. See Merrill, supra note 112, at 980-93 (providing and describing data regard-
ing Supreme Court cases that have addressed whether deference should be afforded to an
administrative interpretation of a statute). Nevertheless, the "reasonable" standard proba-
bly is similar to the well-known "arbitrary or capricious" standard. Sunstein, supra note
108, at 2105; cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (indicating that "an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended [the agency] to consider").
117. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
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(ATF), 118 the FDA,1 9 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 2 0 the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS),' 2' and the Department of Agriculture 122
all play current or potential regulatory roles. Congress announced the
regulatory schemes most relevant to the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction
over tobacco, however, in two relatively recent enactments: the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) 123 and the Compre-
hensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act (CSTHEA).' 24 Signif-
icantly, neither the FCLAA nor the CSTHEA provides a regulatory role
for the FDA.125
In the FCLAA, Congress purported to "establish a comprehensive
Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising" as they
pertain to the relationship between smoking and health. 26 The statute
sets forth two explicit purposes for federal involvement. First, the
FCLAA attests to Congress' intent to keep the public informed of the
118. See 27 C.F.R. §§ 270.61-.76 (1995) (authorizing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms to qualify tobacco manufacturers and to regulate the process of manufactur-
ing tobacco products).
119. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons ... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F.
Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (holding that a vendor's cigarettes were "drugs" within the
meaning of the FDCA because the vendor's claims demonstrated that the product was
intended to affect bodily structure); United States v. 46 Cartons . . .Fairfax Cigarettes, 113
F. Supp. 336, 339 (D.N.J. 1953) (holding that a vendor's cigarettes were drugs within the
meaning of the FDCA because the vendor's claims implied that use of the product would
prevent or mitigate disease).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (1994) (requiring the Federal Trade Commission to ap-
prove the arrangement and timely rotation of warning statements on cigarette labels).
121. See 26 U.S.C. § 5701(b) (1994) (authorizing the Internal Revenue Service to im-
pose taxes upon domestic and imported cigarettes).
122. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1312-1313 (1994) (authorizing the United States Department of
Agriculture to set production quotas and price levels for the tobacco leaf).
123. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 88 1331-
1341 (1994)).
124. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §8 4401-
4408 (1994)).
125. See text accompanying infra notes 126-35 (describing the FCLAA and the
CSTHEA). But cf. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, at 41,352-53 (asserting that
neither the FCLAA nor the CSTHEA preempts FDA regulation of tobacco).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). The significant health hazards that cigarettes posed
prompted Congress to consider and enact the FCLAA. See H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 2351-52 (discussing the
Surgeon General's recommendation for remedial action to deal with health problems re-
lated to cigarette smoking). Because the cigarette issue is multi-faceted, Congress unam-
biguously reserved the right to fashion an appropriate remedy. See H.R. REP. No. 449,
supra, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2351-52 (stating that remedial action regarding
cigarette smoking is Congress's responsibility). Congress cited the need to examine all
aspects of the issue, including the broad implications for public health, health research, the
tobacco raising and manufacturing industries, and the television, radio, and publishing in-
dustries. Id.
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health hazards related to cigarette smoking. 127 Second, the statute de-
clares Congress' intent to protect the national economy by avoiding "di-
verse, nonuniform, and confusing" regulations addressed at any
relationship between smoking and health. 128  The statutory scheme
achieves these purposes by requiring warning notices on cigarette adver-
tisements and labels, 129 and by prohibiting television and radio advertis-
ing of cigarettes. 3 ° In addition, the statutory scheme requires the
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the FTC to submit annual
reports concerning smoking-related health and advertising issues to
Congress.' 31
The CSTHEA's regulatory framework for smokeless tobacco products
bears many similarities to the FCLAA's regulatory framework for ciga-
rettes. Like the FCLAA, the CSTHEA requires warning notices 32 and
prohibits television and radio advertising.' 33 The CSTHEA also requires
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit reports to Con-
gress on the health effects of smokeless tobacco products. 134 Finally, the
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1994).
128. Id. § 1331(2)(B).
129. Id. § 1333. The FCLAA requires cigarette manufacturers to rotate four warning
statements on the labels of cigarette packages. Id. § 1333(a)(1). The required warnings
are bold and specific:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Re-
sult in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
Id.
130. Id. § 1335.
131. Id. § 1337(a)-(b). The FCLAA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices to submit an annual report to Congress discussing current information concerning the
health consequences of smoking. Id. § 1337(a)(1). In addition, the FTC must submit an
annual report detailing current advertising and promotional practices of cigarette manufac-
turers. Id. § 1337(b)(1). Moreover, both the Secretary of HHS and the FTC are required
to recommend legislation, if appropriate. Id. § 1337(a)(2), (b)(2).
132. Id. § 4402. Manufacturers must display one of three warnings on packages of
smokeless tobacco products: "WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH
CANCER; WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND
TOOTH LOSS; AND WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE
TO CIGARETTES." Id. § 4402(a)(1).
133. Id. § 4402(f).
134. Id. § 4403(b). The CSTHEA directs manufacturers of smokeless tobacco to sub-
mit to the Secretary a list of product ingredients on a yearly basis. Id. § 4403(a). Using
these lists, and any other information pertinent to the public interest, the Secretary keeps
Congress informed of the smokeless tobacco issue with regular reports. Id. § 4403(b).
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CSTHEA provides for public education programs and research on the
relationship between smokeless tobacco and health.135
B. The Dubious Relationship Between the FDA and Tobacco
1. Cigarettes as Drugs: The Role of Tobacco Vendors' Claims
Although tobacco products are popularly classified as drugs, 36 neither
the text of the FDCA nor its legislative history mentions tobacco or to-
bacco products. 137 Indeed, most legislation concerning tobacco use fo-
cuses upon tobacco's health consequences, not its potential status as a
drug.138 Nevertheless, in two instances, the FDA relied on marketing
representations to bring cigarettes within the statutory definition of
"drug."
In United States v. 46 Cartons ... Fairfax Cigarettes,39 promotional
materials suggested that a particular brand of cigarettes would decrease a
smoker's odds of contracting colds and other respiratory infections. 4 °
135. Id. § 4401.
136. See OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 87-91, 102-03 (1994) (discussing cigarette and smokeless tobacco
use as they influence "other drug use" among teenagers) [hereinafter PREVENTING To-
BACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE].
137. See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301-395 (1994)); CHARLES W. DUNN, FED-
ERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD
(reprinting committee reports, floor debates, and hearings related to congressional consid-
eration of the Act from 1933-38).
138. See SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 14, at 147-74 (describing
legislation through 1990 to control tobacco use in North America, Latin America, and
eight Carribean countries). Under the FDA's proposed regulations, cigarettes and smoke-
less tobacco constitute drug delivery systems designed to deliver nicotine to the tobacco
user. See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (describing the FDA's classification of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as drug delivery systems). In contrast, legislation to con-
trol tobacco use in the United States and abroad tends to focus on tobacco advertising,
SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 14, at 148-50, warning statements,
id. at 150-52, restrictions on tobacco use in public places and the workplace, id at 153-57,
restrictions on access to young people, id. at 157-58, and health education strategies, id. at
158-61. Granted, the FDA's proposed regulations address advertising, health education,
and tobacco use by young people; nevertheless, the Agency's authority to implement these
measures necessarily involves a finding that tobacco products are drugs, as opposed to
ordinary consumer products. See infra notes 155-90 and accompanying text (describing the
FDA's analysis of jurisdiction and conclusion that nicotine is a drug). The FDA has no
authority to promulgate regulations based upon the health consequences of smoking or
any other health hazard. Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236,239 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
139. 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953).
140. Id. at 338-39. The vendor sold cartons of cigarettes with leaflets attached to them,
entitled "How Fairfax Cigarettes may help you." Id. at 336.
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The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, distin-
guishing claims of respiratory benefits from claims of smoking enjoyment,
ruled that the cigarettes were drugs within § 321(g)(1)(B) of the FDCA
because those marketing representations demonstrated an intent to miti-
gate, cure, or prevent disease. 14 1 Similarly, in United States v. 354 Bulk
Cartons... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes,42 the same court examined
advertising claims that a particular brand of cigarettes suppressed appe-
tite and reduced weight.143  Consistent with § 321(g)(1)(C), the court
found ample evidence to demonstrate an intent to affect the "structure or
any function" of the body: the marketing claims demonstrated an intent
to affect body weight, and the cigarettes purported to contain tartaric
acid, an appetite suppressant.1'" The court thus held that the marketing
claims brought the specific brand of cigarettes within the purview of
§ 321(g)(1)(C).145
In addition to evaluating drug jurisdiction based on a cigarette vendor's
express health claims, the FDA also has analyzed the issue underlying the
current controversy: whether cigarettes, irrespective of vendor claims, are
drugs within the FDCA.146 In the late 1970s, the public interest group
Action on Smoking and Health 147 requested the FDA to assert jurisdic-
tion over nicotine-containing cigarettes as drugs or devices within the
meaning of § 321(g) and (h). 1 48 The FDA refused the petition, contend-
141. Id. at 338-39. The court acknowledged that the vendor did not believe it was sell-
ing "drugs," but maintained that the leaflet left the purchaser with the clear impression
that the cigarettes would help the smoker combat colds and viral infections. Id.
142. 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959).
143. Id. at 849. The back of the cigarette package claimed "Trim Reducing-aid ciga-
rettes contain a patented appetite satient that takes the edge off your appetite." Id.
144. Id. at 848-50.
145. Id. at 851.
146. See Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, to John F. Banzhaf, III, Executive Director and Gen-
eral Counsel, Action on Smoking and Health 1 (Dec. 5, 1977) (rejecting a petition to assert
jurisdiction over cigarettes); Letter from Mark Novitch, for Jere E. Goyan, Commissioner
of Food and Drugs, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to John F. Banzhaf,
III, and Peter N. Georgiades, Action on Smoking and Health 2 (Nov. 25, 1980) (same).
147. Action on Smoking and Health is one of several public interest groups that fre-
quently petition the FDA to regulate tobacco products. See Action on Smoking or Health
v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (requesting the FDA to assert jurisdiction over
nicotine-containing cigarettes and restrict their sale to pharmacies). Another such group,
Coalition on Smoking OR Health, comprises the American Cancer Association, the Amer-
ican Lung Association, and the American Heart Association. Health Consequences of
Smoking: Nicotine Addiction: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environ-
ment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1988)
(statement of Scott D. Ballin, Chairman, Coalition on Smoking OR Health).
148. See Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d. at 237 (describing the request). Ac-
tion on Smoking and Health also petitioned the FDA to restrict the sale of cigarettes to
pharmacies and to regulate cigarettes at least as strictly as saccharin. Id.
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ing that it would assert jurisdiction over cigarettes only when the vendor
or manufacturer asserted health claims related to the cigarettes.149 In a
subsequent challenge to the FDA's determination, Action on Smoking
and Health v. Harris,15 ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upheld the FDA's refusal to assert jurisdiction.151 De-
ferring to the FDA's decision, the District of Columbia Circuit construed
the "structure or any function" language of § 321(g)(1)(C) narrowly.15
Further, the court cited congressional acquiescence to the FDA's lack of
jurisdiction over tobacco to support the Agency's inaction. 153 Although
Action on Smoking and Health was decided in 1980, congressional acqui-
escence remains a significant issue; Congress has considered and rejected
several attempts to amend the FDCA to include cigarettes within the
FDA's drug jurisdiction. 54
149. Id.
150. 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 242-43.
152. Id. at 239-41; see supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (describing the impact
of Action on Smoking and Health on the FDA's drug jurisdiction).
153. Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 241-42 (citations omitted). In its thor-
ough discussion of congressional acquiescence, the District of Columbia Circuit found first
that the FDA had advised Congress repeatedly of the Agency's inability to assert jurisdic-
tion over cigarettes unaccompanied by vendor health claims. See id. at 241 (citing congres-
sional hearings and statements by former FDA Commissioners). The court examined next
an analogous situation involving the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CSPC), and
embraced "the wisdom of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes
that have been consistently communicated to the legislative branch." Id. at 241-42. The
CSPC issue began with the FDA's determination that it could not regulate cigarettes under
the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA). Id. at 241. Subsequently, Congress
amended the FHSA, transferring the FDA's jurisdiction under the FHSA to the CPSC. Id.
A public interest group filed suit against the CPSC in an attempt to compel the Agency to
assert jurisdiction over "high tar" cigarettes. Id. The District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the CPSC possessed jurisdiction, and Congress reacted within two
months. Id. at 241-42. In less than one year, Congress eliminated the CPSC's jurisdiction
over "high tar" cigarettes. Id. at 242.
Standing alone, Action on Smoking and Health is not dispositive of the current issue
regarding the FDA's attempt to regulate tobacco products. First, Action on Smoking -and
Health did not address whether the FDA could regulate cigarettes as medical devices. Id.
at 237 n.4. Second, the opinion expressly recognized that the FDA is not "irrevocably
bound by any long-standing interpretation and representations thereof to the legislative
branch." Id. at 242 n.10. Rather, an agency may revise its interpretations, so long as it
provides a "reasoned explanation for its action." Id. Nonetheless, the FDA's current anal-
ysis of jurisdiction constitutes a severe departure from FDCA jurisprudence, and is prob-
lematic in many respects. See infra notes 201-46 and accompanying text (scrutinizing the
FDA's jurisdictional analysis). In addition, the FDA's new interpretation leads to inconsis-
tent results under the FDCA. See infra notes 271-89 and accompanying text (demonstrat-
ing that the FDA's interpretation is contrary to the FDCA).
154. E.g., S. 2298, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) (seeking "to regulate the sale and
distribution of tobacco products"); H.R. 4350, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) (same); S. 769,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (same); H.R. 1494, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (same);
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2. The FDA's New Analysis of Jurisdiction Over Tobacco
On August 11, 1995, the FDA signaled a major change in its interpreta-
tion of the FDCA by asserting jurisdiction over cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco. 155 Rather than executing the traditional enforcement action as a
means to assert jurisdiction, the FDA chose instead to effect jurisdiction
by way of notice and comment rulemaking. 156 Consequently, the FDA
published a sixty-four page legal analysis of its jurisdiction over cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco products in the Federal Register.157 The Agency's
legal analysis addressed three main issues: (1) the pharmacological effects
that allegedly bring tobacco products within the statutory language of
§ 321(g)(1)(C) and (h)(3); (2) the appropriate standard of vendor intent;
and (3) the proposed classification of tobacco products under the
FDCA.158
Addressing the effects of tobacco products on the body, the FDA sug-
gested first that Congress intended an expansive reading of
§ 321(g)(1)(C) and its parallel provision for devices, § 321(h)(3).' 59 With
that foundation, the Agency asserted that both sections reach products
that are not intended for therapeutic uses. 160 Further, the FDA argued,
both sections encompass products that have, or that vendors promote as
H.R. 3294, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) (same); see infra notes 254-61 and accompanying
text (discussing the failed FDCA amendments).
155. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,463-66; see supra note
12 (explaining the Agency's rationale for its change of position on the tobacco issue).
156. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,455. Traditional en-
forcement actions, including injunctions, seizures, and criminal sanctions, allow the FDA to
assert jurisdiction over individual products and manufacturers. See Bass, supra note 6, at
62-64 (reviewing the historical development of FDA's enforcement powers). Notice and
Comment Rulemaking, on the other hand, is more efficient because it allows the FDA to
promulgate regulations applicable to an entire industry. See Peter B. Hutt, The Philosophy
of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 177, 183 (1973) (contending that case-by-case enforcement is an inadequate regulatory
approach); see also 1 O'REILLY, supra note 4, § 4.01, at 4-1 to 4-7 (introducing classifica-
tions of FDA regulations). Congress authorized the FDA to promulgate regulations for
the "efficient enforcement" of the FDCA, a broad standard. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994).
157. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,462-526.
158. See infra notes 159-90 and accompanying text (summarizing the FDA's analysis of
its jurisdiction over tobacco products).
159. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,467 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 2139, supra note 21, at 3).
160. Id.; see United States v. Undetermined Quantities of "Cal-Ban 3000", 776 F. Supp.
249, 253 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (stating that "the term 'drug' should be interpreted broadly and
not limited to products that are commonly known as drugs"). But cf Gamerman, supra
note 4, at 809 (arguing that therapeutic intent is an essential predicate to FDA device
jurisdiction, but that such term has not been defined adequately).
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having, pharmacological or physiological effects. 1 61 The FDA concluded
that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products affect the structure and
function of the body. 162 Specifically, the FDA determined that the nico-
tine in these tobacco products exerts a pharmacological effect on the cen-
tral nervous system, particularly the brain.
1 63
The FDA continued its legal analysis by examining the appropriate
standard of vendor intent. 164 According to the Agency's analysis, vendor
intent should be evaluated against an objective standard,165 that is,
whether a reasonable person would believe that the vendor intended the
product to affect the structure or any function of the body.' 66 The FDA
also argued that the standard of objective intent embraced the notion of
foreseeability, allowing an inquiry into whether the vendor could foresee
that consumers would use a product for pharmacological purposes.'
67
The FDA maintained that it may base a finding of objective intent on the
161. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,470. The FDA cited
cocaine as an example of a substance that falls within the drug definition because it pro-
duces psychoactive effects, thus affecting the structure or function of the body. Id. at
41,469-70. The FDA's assertion, however, ignores the fact that Congress declared co-
caine's drug status unambiguously. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(17)(D) (1994) (providing that the
term "narcotic drug" includes cocaine). Congress has not expressed any similar intent for
tobacco products, although it did reserve the exclusive right to remedy the public health
consequences resulting from tobacco use. See H.R. REP. No. 449, supra note 126, at 2-3,
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2351-52 (discussing the scope of the tobacco problem in
light of the FCLAA).
162. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,470.
163. Id. The FDA contends, in scattered sections of the Federal Register, that nicotine
affects the structure and function of the body in several ways. First, the FDA maintains
that nicotine is addictive, and that there is a pharmacologic basis to the addiction. Id. at
41,470, 41,483-88, 41,540-41. Nicotine attaches to receptors in the brain, thus stimulating
the release of dopamine, a brain chemical that helps to produce pleasurable feelings. Id. at
41,535-36. Second, the FDA notes that nicotine produces psychoactive effects, which elec-
troencephalographic (EEG) analysis apparently confirmed, by alternatively stimulating
and depressing mood. Id. at 41,488, 41,536, 41,632-33. Finally, the FDA contends that
nicotine affects the structure of the body because it affects body weight. Id. at 41,489,
41,580. The FDA's use of the term "pharmacologic effects" is tautological; "pharmaco-
logic" simply refers to the study of drugs. See DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1000
(26th ed. 1985) (defining pharmacology as "the science that deals with the origin, nature,
chemistry, effects, and uses of drugs").
164. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,471. As the Second
Circuit noted, "[t]he vendors' intent in selling the product to the public is the key element
in this statutory definition." National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325,
333 (2d Cir. 1977) (construing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)).
165. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,472.
166. Id. at 41,471, 41,474. A subjective standard of vendor intent, on the other hand,
would consider the vendor's actual state of mind. Id at 41,472-73. The FDA argued that a
subjective intent standard would limit the relevant evidence to express representations,
promotional claims, and similar indications. Id. at 41,473.
167. Id.
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totality of the relevant evidence, including labeling claims, advertise-
ments, oral or written statements of vendors or their representatives, ac-
tual consumer use, and vendor knowledge of consumer use.168
Having stressed its authority to determine objective intent by the total-
ity of the relevant evidence, the FDA asserted next that certain types of
evidence, even when considered alone, are sufficient to establish objec-
tive intent. 169 As an example, the FDA claimed that a product may be a
drug merely because it contains a pharmacologically active ingredient.17°
Accordingly, even in the absence of explicit drug claims, the presence of
the pharmacologically active ingredient is determinative of objective in-
tent and thus, the product's drug status. 7' Additionally, the FDA
claimed that it could establish objective intent solely by evidence of con-
sumer use of the product.' 72 Thus, the FDA argued, mere evidence
showing consumer use to be almost exclusively for pharmacological pur-
poses would be sufficient to establish the requisite vendor intent.1
73
After laying the foundation for its interpretation of objective intent,
the FDA applied its interpretation to tobacco products. 174 According to
the FDA, tobacco vendors possess the statutory intent to affect the struc-
ture or function of the body because a reasonable tobacco vendor can
foresee nicotine's pharmacological effects-addictive properties,
psychoactive or mood alterations, and impact on weight control.75 In
addition, the FDA claimed that consumers use tobacco "nearly exclu-
sively for pharmacological purposes," thus independently establishing the
requisite vendor intent.' 76 Finally, the FDA pointed to tobacco industry
168. Id. at 41,473-74. The FDA has promulgated regulations adopting an objective
standard of vendor intent. 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (1995) (drugs); id. § 801.4 (devices).
169. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,475-81; see text ac-
companying infra notes 170-73.
170. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,475-76.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 41,479-80; see supra note 57 (discussing the showing required to demon-
strate objective intent by consumer use alone).
173. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,579-80.
174. See id. at 41,482-520.
175. Id. at 41,483-90. Nicotine's effects on the structure and function of the body are
foreseeable, the FDA reasoned, because the effects have been so well documented in sci-
entific literature. Id. at 41,483.
176. Id. at 41,490-91. The FDA cited statistics to demonstrate that consumers use to-
bacco products regularly and compulsively. Id. at 41,486. According to the FDA, 87% of
cigarette smokers use cigarettes daily; only 3% of smokers who attempt to quit achieve
long-term success; clinical studies have demonstrated that between 75% and 90% of fre-
quent smokers are addicted; likewise, more than one-third of smokeless tobacco users are
addicted. Id. at 41,486-87. Alternatively, the FDA argued that, even if the evidence of
consumer use were not sufficient to establish vendor intent, the totality of the FDA's evi-
dence demonstrates the requisite intent. Id. at 41,490-91.
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research, documents, and statements of key personnel to support its find-
ing of vendor intent.177
Under the FDA's analysis, the tobacco industry research, documents,
and personnel statements demonstrated vendor intent in two important
respects. First, the evidence confirmed that tobacco vendors know that
nicotine affects bodily structure and functions, and that consumers use
tobacco products for precisely these purposes. 178 Second, the evidence
confirmed that tobacco vendors act to facilitate this use of tobacco prod-
ucts, namely through manipulating nicotine levels in cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco.179
177. Id. at 41,491-520. To support its jurisdictional determination, the FDA has
amassed hundreds of tobacco-related studies, industry documents, and statements. Id. at
41,492. The FDA, however, did not present evidence to implicate every tobacco manufac-
turer in the United States. Id. at 41,525. Nonetheless, the Agency contends that its evi-
dence applies to the entire tobacco industry because it implicates over 95% of the United
States tobacco market. Id.
178. Id. at 41,492-504. Comparing the tobacco industry to the pharmaceutical industry,
the FDA cited studies, which the tobacco industry funded and conducted, to illustrate that
tobacco manufacturers know that nicotine affects the structure and function of the body.
Id. at 41,496, 41,499. Most of the studies the FDA cited explored the role of nicotine in the
human body. See, e.g., id. at 41,493 (nicotine's addictive properties); id. at 41,495, 41,497
n.l, 41,499 (nicotine's psychoactive effects, including effects on performance and cogni-
tion); id. at 41,496 (nicotine absorption and delivery to brain). Significantly, the FDA cited
statements by industry personnel, including scientists, executives, and even an attorney,
who stated: "[w]e are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug." Id. at
41,494 (quoting the general counsel to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation).
The FDA also asserted that the evidence demonstrated the tobacco industry's knowl-
edge that consumers use tobacco as a drug. Id. at 41,499-504. This evidence consists
mostly of documents and statements, such as one statement by a Philip Morris official:
Without nicotine, the argument goes, there would be no smoking. Some strong
evidence can be marshalled to support this argument:
1) No one has ever become a cigarette smoker by smoking cigarettes without
nicotine.
2) Most of the physiological responses to inhaled smoke have been shown to be
nicotine-related.
3) Despite many low nicotine brand entries in the market place, none of them
have captured a substantial segment of the market.
Id. at 41,500 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting William Dunn, Jr., a Phil-
lip Morris executive).
179. Id. at 41,504. The FDA contended that many of the tobacco industry's technolo-
gies and practices demonstrate an intent to affect the structure and function of the body.
Id. at 41,504-05. Specifically, the FDA maintained that the following tobacco industry
practices demonstrate the requisite intent: (1) developing high-nicotine tobacco plants
through genetic engineering; (2) blending different types of tobacco leaves to attain higher
levels of nicotine; (3) fortifying tobacco products with nicotine powders and other deriva-
tives; and (4) adding chemicals, such as ammonia, to increase the amount of nicotine deliv-
ered to the smoker. Id. at 41,507, 41,509-11. According to the FDA, these industry
practices are successful because the level of nicotine is extremely consistent from cigarette
to cigarette. Id. at 41,509.
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The FDA ended its legal analysis of jurisdiction over tobacco products
by concluding that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products appropri-
ately are regulated as devices under the FDCA.180 Specifically, the
Agency concluded that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are devices be-
cause they constitute drug delivery systems. 181 Under this analysis, regu-
lating a cigarette as a device is consistent with the statutory definition in
that the cigarette " 'does not achieve its primary intended purposes
through chemical action, [and] is not dependent upon being metabolized
for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.' "182 Rather, ac-
cording to the FDA, the cigarette's primary purpose is to deliver nicotine
to the tobacco user.183 Further, the user does not metabolize the ciga-
rette, but discards it after use." Similarly, the device element of smoke-
less tobacco is the tobacco itself, which delivers nicotine to the user by
way of absorption through the cheek tissue; after the nicotine is absorbed,
the user removes the tobacco from the mouth. 185 Like the cigarette, the
smokeless tobacco product's primary purpose is to deliver nicotine to the
user.
186
Although the FDA claimed jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as
drugs, devices, or both, the Agency concluded that regulation pursuant to
its device authorities was the most appropriate option. 187 Conceding that
regulation pursuant to the FDCA's drug authorities might cause tobacco
180. Id. at 41,521-23; see supra notes 67-99 and accompanying text (outlining the FDA's
device jurisdiction).
181. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,521-23. The FDA reg-
ulates as devices several contrivances containing drugs, also known as drug delivery sys-
tems. Id. Examples of such drug delivery systems include pre-filled syringes, transdermal
patches, and metered-dose inhalers. Id. at 41,521. The FDA found that "a cigarette is
analogous to a metered-dose inhaler, an instrument that converts a drug into an aerosol-
ized form for inhalation and delivery to the lungs for absorption into the bloodstream." Id.
at 41,522.
182. Id. at 41,522 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994)).
183. Id. The FDA noted that on average, a cigarette delivers approximately 1.0 mg of
nicotine to the lungs when inhaled. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 41,522-23. The FDA analogized smokeless tobacco to "infusion devices or
transdermal patches that deliver a controlled continuous amount of nicotine to the cheek
tissue for absorption into the bloodstream." Id.
186. Id. Specifically, the FDA stated that "[tihe primary purpose of the tobacco is to
provide a palpable vehicle that allows nicotine to be extracted from the tobacco by the
user's saliva so that it may be absorbed into the body." Id. at 41,523.
187. Id. at 41,523-24. The FDCA's provisions for the regulation of combination prod-
ucts allow the FDA to regulate some products as drugs, devices, or both. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(g)(1) (1994) (allowing combination products to be regulated under the FDCA); see
also supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (explaining the FDA's authority to regulate
combination products).
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products to be removed from the marketplace,' the FDA expressed
concern over the detrimental effect that such a drastic remedy would
have on the millions of Americans currently addicted to tobacco.'8 9 The
FDCA's flexible device authorities permit a staged, multi-tiered approach
to meeting the statutory requirements of safety and effectiveness; there-
fore, the FDA concluded, it should regulate cigarettes and smokeless to-
bacco as devices. 190
3. Proposed Regulations to Curtail Tobacco Use
After completing the legal analysis and justification for its jurisdiction
over tobacco, the FDA proposed a regulatory solution. Relying on statis-
tical evidence indicating that nearly all tobacco users begin smoking or
using smokeless tobacco at a young age, 19 1 the FDA limited its regulatory
focus to one major goal: reducing the number of people under eighteen
years of age who become addicted to nicotine through cigarette and
smokeless tobacco use.' 92
188. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,523-24. The FDA's
Commissioner, Dr. David Kessler, stated that "I am convinced that [a] finding [of safety
and effectiveness] would not be made by this agency and that therefore [cigarettes] could
not be approved as a new drug." Justice Department to Investigate Allegations of Nicotine
Manipulation, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 372 (Mar. 24, 1994) (quoting Dr. Kess-
ler's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Agricul-
ture, Rural Development, FDA, and Related Agencies on March 16, 1994). Similarly, the
Institute of Medicine concluded that "an inevitable effect of classifying nicotine-containing
tobacco products as 'drugs' would be to ban them." GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE, supra
note 15, at 235.
189. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,523-24. The FDA
stated that currently, over 40 million Americans are addicted to cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products. Id. at 41,524.
190. Id. at 41,524.
191. See Proposed Rules, supra note 9, at 41,314, 41,316 n.9 (citing a 1994 Surgeon
General's Report). This Surgeon General's Report described one study that found that
88% of all smokers had tried their first cigarette by age 18. PREVENTING TOBACCO USE
AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note 136, at 65-67.
192. See Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,785-87 (describing
regulatory objectives). The FDA found that "addiction to nicotine-containing tobacco
Products is, first and foremost, a pediatric disease." Id. at 41,786. Thus, the Agency con-
cluded, "FDA regulatory action should be based on a youth-centered strategy that is in-
tended to reduce the risk that future generations of Americans will become dependent on
nicotine without prohibiting access to these products by adults." Id.
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The proposed regulatory framework 193 imposes numerous restrictions
on tobacco vendors. 194 Briefly, the FDA would prohibit vending machine
sales, self-service displays, mail-order sales, and "other 'impersonal'
modes" of selling tobacco products.195 The proposed regulations also
prohibit any item or service, whether complimentary or for profit, from
bearing the brand name of any cigarette or smokeless tobacco product. 196
Similarly, the proposed regulations disallow the brand-name sponsorship
of any sporting or cultural event. 197 The FDA would limit billboard ad-
vertising to black text on a white background, 98 and require all adver-
tisements to state that tobacco products are "Nicotine-Delivery
Device[s]."'19 9 Finally, the regulations would require tobacco vendors to
establish a national public educational program to discourage persons
under eighteen years of age from using tobacco products.2"'
193. The regulatory framework was proposed pursuant to the Act's restricted device
authorities. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (1994) (providing general authority to regulate re-
stricted devices); id. § 352(r) (providing authority to regulate advertising of restricted de-
vices). Restricted devices establish yet another subdivision of the general device category.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the classification system for devices).
If the FDA determines that it cannot otherwise reasonably assure a device's safety and
effectiveness, the FDCA permits the Agency to restrict the sale, distribution, or use of that
potentially harmful device. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e); 21 C.F.R. § 807.3(i) (1995). Generally, the
Agency's restricted device authorities are similar to its prescription drug authorities. See
Huar & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 786-87 (comparing restricted devices to prescription
drugs). Indeed, most restrictions the FDA has imposed involved only a requirement that
the device be sold by prescription. Munsey & Holstein, supra note 68, at 394-95.
The FDA and the FTC share responsibilities for regulating medical device advertising:
the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate advertising of restricted devices, while the FTC regu-
lates advertising for all other devices. Munsey & Holstein, supra note 68, at 394. Congress
expressly created this split of authority in the Medical Device Amendments. See S. REP.
No. 33, supra note 1, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1086 (providing that the
Federal Trade Commission Act is inapplicable to the advertising of restricted devices). In
delegating restricted device advertising to the FDA, Congress declared that the authority
"is more properly vested in the agency most knowledgeable about the area and the one
that is truly charged with matters affecting public health and thus assuring the safety and
efficacy of medical devices." Id. Interestingly, the FDA has rarely used its authority to
regulate advertising of restricted devices. See Hur & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 787 (not-
ing that the FDA has not used its authority to regulate labeling and advertising of re-
stricted devices, except to condition approval of certain devices).
194. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, at 41,372-75.
195. Id. at 41,374.
196. Id. This prohibition would not apply to the actual cigarette or smokeless tobacco
product. Id.
197. Id. at 41,375. Teams in sponsored events, however, could wear labeling that identi-
fied the cigarette or smokeless tobacco product. Id. at 41,374.
198. Id. at 41,374. The FDA explained that "text-only" advertising is less attractive to
young people, yet it preserves the advertiser's ability to convey useful information about
tobacco products to adults. Id. at 41,335-36.
199. Id. at 41,374.
200. Id.
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III. THE FDA's ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTION: SMOKE AND MIRRORS
The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products is a noble
effort to address a significant health problem. On many points, the
FDA's analysis is correct.2 1 Nevertheless, when considered in its totality,
the jurisdictional analysis constitutes a significant departure from the leg-
islative intent and judicial interpretations of the FDCA.202
A. Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco as Affecting the "Structure or
any Function" of the Body
In its legal analysis, the FDA asserted that tobacco products have phar-
macological effects and lead to addiction, thereby affecting the "structure
or any function" of the body.20 3 On this isolated assertion, the FDA's
analysis comports with FDCA precedent. 21 It is true that Congress in-
tended an expansive reading of the FDCA's "structure or any function"
language.205 It also is true that this language reaches products intended
for nonmedical uses.2 06 Indeed, the courts have complied with this legis-
lative intent, finding that even the process of hair growth is a function of
the body.20 7 Thus, the FDA has a rational basis for asserting that nico-
201. See infra notes 203-08, 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA's find-
ings that tobacco products affect the structure or function of the body and that vendor
intent is determined by an objective standard).
202. See infra notes 209-35 and accompanying text (examining the FDA's proposed
standard of objective intent).
203. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,467-70; see supra notes
162-63 and accompanying text (describing the structures and functions affected by tobacco
products).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Undetermined Quantities . . . "Pets Smellfree", 22 F.3d
235, 240 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that digestion is a function within the statutory defini-
tion); United States v. 23, More or Less, Articles ... Time to Sleep, 192 F.2d 308, 309 (2d
Cir. 1951) (holding that sleep is a function of the body); United States v. Kasz Enters., Inc.,
855 F. Supp. 534, 540 (D.R.I.) (finding that the process of hair growth is a bodily function),
modified on other grounds, 862 F. Supp 717 (D.R.I. 1994); United States v. Eighteen Units,
More or Less of An Article of Drug... "Sports Oxygen", Civ. No. 89-2085 (D.N.J. Oct. 27,
1992) (holding that boosting athletic performance by increasing oxygen absorption affects
a bodily function), reprinted in 4 Food & Drug L. Rep. 77, 80 (1993); United States v. 354
Bulk Cartons... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847,851 (D.N.J. 1959) (hold-
ing that a claimed intent to affect appetite demonstrates an intent to affect body weight,
and thus, the structure of the body).
205. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent to
expand the definition of "drug").
206. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (con-
struing the "structure or any function" language to contemplate a physiologic rather than a
therapeutic effect).
207. Kasz Enters., 855 F. Supp. at 540; see supra note 204 (citing cases construing the
"structure or any function" language to reach products without therapeutic uses).
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tine, with its effects on the brain, affects the structure and function of the
body.208
Mere effects on a bodily structure or function, however, do not deter-
mine a product's drug status.2 °9 Throughout its analysis, the FDA subtly
understates the importance of the vendor's intent, a key element of the
drug definition.210 Evidence of the actual effects of tobacco products is
relevant only to the extent that it is probative of the vendor's intent.21
By creating a definition that turns upon the vendor's intent, the drafters
of the FDCA sought to strike a balance between consumer protection
and legitimate business interests.212 Allowing FDA jurisdiction over
drugs and devices when the vendor's representations, in connection with
the sale of the product, demonstrate an intent to market a product that
will affect the structure or any function of the body achieves this
balance.213
208. The FDA probably devoted a section of its legal analysis to the "structure or any
function" language, among other reasons, to overcome any argument that cigarettes
merely stimulate the senses. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236,
240 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (implying that cigarettes affect the structure or function of the body
remotely because they stimulate the senses); see also supra note 58 (quoting the Action on
Smoking and Health court's decision to limit the reach of § 321(g)(1)(C)).
209. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing intended use, the true
determinant of a product's drug status under the FDCA).
210. See, e.g., Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,471 (describ-
ing intent in terms of foreseeable consequences); id. at 41,475 (stating that the mere pres-
ence of pharmacologically active ingredients demonstrates intent); id. at 41,477 (describing
intent in terms of consumer use alone).
211. See, e.g., Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 238-39 (stating that the "crux
of FDA jurisdiction over drugs lay in manufacturers' representations as revelatory of their
intent"); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 333 (2d Cir. 1977)
(recognizing that the "vendors' intent in selling the product to the public is the key element
in this statutory definition"); United States v. Two Plastic Drums, 761 F. Supp. 70, 72 (C.D.
I11. 1991) (noting that, in the context of food additives, intended use under the FDCA is
determined according to an objective standard), aff'd, 984 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1993).
212. See S. REP. No. 361, supra note 33, at 4, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 663. The legislative history demonstrates the drafters' desire to allow a
vendor to retain some control over a product's status under the Act:
The manufacturer of the article, through his representations in connection with its
sale, can determine the use to which the article is to be put. For example, the
manufacturer of a laxative which is a medicated candy or chewing gum can bring
his product within the definition of drug and escape that of food by representing
the article fairly and unequivocally as a drug product.
Id.
213. See Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 238-39 (quoting legislative history
emphasizing the importance of the vendor's representations); S. REP. No. 361, supra note
33, at 4, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 663. In Action on Smoking
and Health, the court explored the legislative history, and found that in doubtful cases of
Agency jurisdiction, the FDA would focus upon a vendor's representations. Action on
Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 238.
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B. Pure Puffery: The FDA's New Standard of Objective Intent
Perhaps, from the FDA's perspective, the jurisdictional analysis es-
poused an ideal standard of objective intent. To be sure, the FDA con-
cluded correctly that objective intent is the appropriate standard.2 14
Nonetheless, the Agency's interpretation of that standard would expand
the concept far beyond Congress' intent, as construed in over fifty years
of judicial precedent.2 15
Most significantly, the Agency's adoption of a foreseeable use standard
constitutes a severe departure from FDCA precedent.216 Under the
FDCA's legislative history, the foreseeable use of a product as a drug or
device is not a basis for inferring statutory intent.2 17 On the contrary, the
legislative history explicitly connects a product's drug or device status to
intended use as demonstrated by the vendor's representations.218 Fur-
ther, it is doubtful that any court construing the FDCA has ever relied on
foreseeable use as a component of objective intent.21 9 Even the FDA's
regulations describing the objective intent standard fail to mention fore-
seeable use as indicative of the statutory intent.22 °
To support its foreseeable use standard, the FDA was forced to turn to
cases construing the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 22 ' and the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.222 Courts examining
214. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (examining objective intent standard
as applied in Sudden Change).
215. See infra notes 216-46 and accompanying text (arguing that the FDA's current
analysis departs from legislative intent).
216. See infra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (arguing that the FDA's foreseeable
use standard departs from legislative intent).
217. See S. REP. No. 361, supra note 33, at 4, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 663 (describing intended use by reference to a vendor's representations of
the product, but not foreseeable uses); cf. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra
note 9, at 41,471-73 (discussing the foreseeable use standard without specific reference to
the FDCA's legislative history).
218. S. REP. No. 361, supra note 33, at 4, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 21, at 663.
219. See Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,472-482 (discuss-
ing the foreseeable use standard without reference to judicial constructions of FDCA);
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334 (2d Cir. 1977) (defining
objective intent by reference to labeling, promotional materials, advertising, and any other
relevant source, but not foreseeable product uses).
220. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (1995) (describing the objective intent standard for drugs
as embracing labeling claims, advertisements, oral or written vendor statements, and actual
use of product); id. § 801.4 (discussing the identical objective intent standard in the context
of medical devices).
221. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (1994).
222. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136g (1994); see Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra
note 9, at 41,471, 41,476-79 (citing cases exploring the intent element in the FDCA and
other federal enactments); United States v. Focht, 882 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1989) (construing
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vendor intent under these federal statutes lack extensive legislative his-
tory and judicial precedent to guide their inquiries. 223 In stark contrast,
courts examining vendor intent under the FDCA may turn to volumes of
legislative history and judicial precedent.224 Because the standard of ob-
jective vendor intent under the FDCA is so well developed, the FDA's
resort to cases interpreting other federal statutes is improper.225
the Federal Hazardous Substances Act); N. Jonas & Co. v. United States EPA, 666 F.2d
829 (3d Cir. 1981) (construing the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act);
United States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances Consisting of ... Baby Rattles,
614 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (construing the Federal Hazardous Substances Act).
In Focht, the court faced an issue of first impression: whether the language "intended to
produce," in regulations promulgated pursuant to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA), should be interpreted according to a subjective or an objective standard. Focht,
882 F.2d at 57-58. Relying on the FHSA's remedial purpose, the court concluded that the
language "clearly contemplate[d] an objective seller standard." Id. at 58. The court re-
jected a subjective standard, reasoning that such a standard would frustrate the statutory
purpose. Id. at 59. Under a subjective standard, for instance, a seller could demonstrate a
good faith belief that it did not intend the use in question. See id. at 61 (citing Baby
Rattles, 614 F. Supp. at 232).
Similarly, in Baby Rattles, the court considered whether the language "intended to be
used by children" in the FHSA should be interpreted according to a subjective or an objec-
tive test. Baby Rattles, 614 F. Supp. at 230-32. Like the Focht court, the Baby Rattles court
looked to the FHSA's remedial purpose, and concluded that the "only rational interpreta-
tion of the word 'intended' in the statute calls for an objective test." Id. at 231. The court
expressed its objective test in terms of "whether a reasonable person would believe that
the object is a toy or article intended for use by children." Id.
In N. Jonas & Co., the court considered whether a vendor's product was a "pesticide"
within the meaning of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
N. Jonas & Co., 666 F.2d at 830. Examining the statutory definition of pesticide, the court
concluded that the language "intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating
any pest" necessitated an objective standard. Id. at 831-33 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 162.4).
Further, the court defined this objective standard in terms of the reasonable consumer, and
concluded that "the company intends those uses to which the reasonable consumer will put
its products." Id. at 833.
In all three cases-Focht, Baby Rattles, and N. Jonas-the courts lacked judicial prece-
dent defining an objective intent standard. See Focht, 882 F.2d at 60 n.10 (citing only Baby
Rattles in support); N. Jonas & Co., 666 F.2d at 833 (citing cases construing the FDCA);
Baby Rattles, 614 F. Supp. at 231-32 (relying on statutory language alone). Courts examin-
ing the objective intent standard under the FDCA, on the other hand, may rely on exten-
sive legislative history and years of judicial precedents. See National Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. United States FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 789 (2d Cir. 1974) (describing the objective
intent determination), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975).
223. See supra note 222 (describing cases construing the FHSA and the FIFRA).
224. See supra notes 18-99 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history and
judicial constructions of the FDCA's definitional provisions).
225. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text (describing the objective intent stan-
dard in the context of 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994)). The FDA's argument, in relying
on Focht, N. Jonas & Co., and Baby Rattles, assumed that there is only one type of objec-
tive intent standard. See Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,472-
79 (combining cases defining the FDCA version of objective intent with cases defining
objective intent in light of the FHSA and the FIFRA). The objective intent standard under
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A second problem with the Agency's interpretation of the objective
intent standard involves the proper weight to be accorded to evidence of
consumer use of tobacco products.226 Although consumer use is relevant
to the issue of intent, courts have afforded the FDA limited discretion to
infer vendor intent based solely on consumer use.22 7 To allow such an
inference, the FDA would have to meet the substantial burden of proving
that consumers use tobacco "nearly exclusively" for drug purposes.228 In
the case of cigarettes and tobacco, however, consumer use alone cannot
support an inference of the requisite vendor intent.229 Consumers do not
use tobacco products "nearly exclusively" for drug purposes because too
many other purposes exist, including taste and social image.230
the FDCA, however, must be read against the statute's legislative history connecting in-
tended use with a vendor's representations or other circumstances surrounding the sale of
the product. S. REP. No. 361, supra note 33, at 4, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 663; see Weitzman, supra note 24, at 230 (asserting that courts interpret-
ing the FDCA's definitional provisions must fully consider the legislative history).
The FDA's resort to the cases construing the FHSA and the FIFRA is improper for yet
another reason. Two of the three cases-N. Jonas & Co. and Baby Rattles-expressly
adopted a reasonable person standard. N. Jonas & Co., 666 F.2d at 832; Baby Rattles, 614
F. Supp. at 231. The reasonable person standard directly conflicts with the well-accepted
FDCA principle that the term "drug" should include items not commonly thought of as
drugs. E.g., United States v. Undetermined Quantities of "Cal-Ban 3000", 776 F. Supp.
249, 253 (E.D.N.C. 1991). This principle reflects a major purpose of the Act-to protect
the unwary consumer. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
226. See Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,479-81 (arguing
that the objective intent of tobacco manufacturers to affect the structure or function of the
body may be adduced by consumer use alone); see supra note 57 (discussing evidence of
consumer use as a basis for inferring the statutory intent).
227. See, e.g., Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239-40 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (refusing to find that cigarettes are drugs based solely on the presented evidence of
consumer use); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334-36 (2d Cir.
1977) (refusing to find that high dosage vitamin supplements were drugs based solely on
evidence of consumer use); Millet, Pit & Seed Co. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 84, 89 n.4
(E.D. Tenn. 1977) (refusing to find that apricot kernels sold as dietary supplements were
drugs based upon consumer use), vacated without op. sub nom., United States v. Article of
Food & Drug, 627 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1980).
228. Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 240.
229. Id.
230. See Simon Chapman, Smokers: Why Do They Start-and Continue?, 16 WORLD
HEALTH F. 1, 2-6 (1995) (describing motives for smoking). According to Dr. Chapman,
new smokers often use cigarettes to demonstrate adulthood, rebellion, affluence, fashion
and style, hospitality, friendship, and social class norms. Id at 2-4. Regarding experienced
smokers, Dr. Chapman emphasized the pleasurable aspects of smoking: "Perhaps the most
underemphasized yet obvious reason why many smokers continue to smoke is that they
derive pleasure from both the pharmacological effects of smoking and the social rituals that
surround the act. The psyschopharmacology of nicotine has been studied extensively, but
not the pleasure involved." Id. at 6 (emphasis added). But see Analysis Regarding Agency
Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,563-68 (asserting that other motives for smoking are secon-
dary to usage for drug purposes); id at 41,772-78 (asserting that tobacco vendors know that
other motives for smoking are secondary to usage for drug purposes).
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The FDA further argued that intended use may be inferred merely
from the presence of a pharmacologically active ingredient.23' While this
proposition sounds reasonable in the abstract, the FDCA does not permit
such an inference.232 To the contrary, courts repeatedly have ruled that a
product's actual composition is irrelevant to the drug or device determi-
nation.233 Even so, the FDA bolsters its assertion by referring to past
enforcement actions in which it asserted jurisdiction over products solely
on the basis of the product's composition.3 This evidence may answer
an accusation of inconsistency, but it does not necessarily show that the
Agency is acting within its statutory grant of authority.235
231. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9. at 41,475-76.
232. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (arguing that a product's content
does not determine its drug status). The FDA's jurisdiction to regulate drugs and devices
would be nearly limitless if the Agency were able to infer intended use solely from a prod-
uct's composition or effects on the body. Under such a scheme, products with multiple
potential uses suddenly could be regulated as "drugs" or "medical devices." For example,
an electrostatic air cleaner that emits ozone arguably affects the "structure or any function
of the body." See HurT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 749 (describing the intended use
determination). The FDA, however, properly has concluded that "'electrostatic air clean-
ers are not inherently medical devices' "; such products have numerous uses. Id. (quoting
Letter from R.M. Cooper, FDA Chief Counsel, to S. Lemberg, CPSC Assistant General
Counsel (May 14, 1979)). The proper intended use determination, which considers the
circumstances surrounding the sale, thus prevents arbitrary expansions of the FDA's
authority.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Undetermined Quantities ... "Pets Smellfree", 22 F.3d
235, 239 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that an additive was a drug despite its actual composi-
tion); United States v. An Article ... Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1969)
(holding that a clear liquid lotion was a drug regardless of actual ingredients); United
States v. Kasz Enters., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 534, 539 (D.R.I.) (holding that a hair product was
a drug regardless of its physical properties), amended on other grounds, 862 F. Supp. 717
(D.R.I. 1994). In Kasz, the court concluded that "[wjhether or not a product is a drug...
depends not on the physical properties of the product or what effect the product has on
humans but rather on the intended uses or effects of the product." Id.
234. See Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,527-31 (listing ex-
amples of products the FDA regulated based on the product's composition, consumer use
of the product, or the product's effect on the body).
235. The products subjected to past enforcement actions are either distinguishable from
tobacco products, or were not the subject of judicial review. See id. (listing 11 examples of
products regulated as drugs or devices, two of which were subject to judicial review). Judi-
cial review, however, remains an important check on administrative interpretations. See
Sunstein, supra note 108, at 2086 (suggesting that the Administrative Procedure Act recog-
nized a need for judicial review of administrative actions).
One enforcement action discussed in the Analysis of Agency Jurisdiction involved
"caine" or imitation cocaine, and was the subject of judicial review in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Storage Spaces Designated
Nos. "8" & "49", 777 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that an imitation cocaine
product was a "drug" under the FDCA), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); Analysis of
Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,527-28 (discussing imitation cocaine as support for
the FDA's assertion of tobacco jurisdiction). In Storage Spaces, the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether products labelled as "incense" were drugs under the FDCA. Storage Spaces,
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C. Defying Logic: Cigarettes and Tobacco Leaves as Medical Devices
The FDA's characterization of cigarettes and tobacco leaves as medical
devices is one of many examples of the Agency's ability to interpret its
enabling act creatively.236 To be sure, the vast majority of products the
FDA regulates as medical devices are clearly within the Agency's jurisdic-
tion.237 Nonetheless, the Agency has a history of jurisdictional determi-
nations that are questionable at best.238 The tobacco analysis is one such
determination.239
In practical effect, the FDA's unusual treatment of its tobacco jurisdic-
tion is somewhat akin to the controversy that gave rise to the AMP and
Bacto-Unidisk decisions.24° In those cases, the FDA found its device au-
thorities insufficient to regulate the products at issue properly.241 Rather
than settle for less regulation, the FDA chose to categorize the prod-
ucts- blood vessel loops, surgical clamps, and a paper disk-as drugs.242
These unusually broad classifications were one reason that prompted
777 F.2d at 1366-67. In finding that the products were "drugs," the Ninth Circuit empha-
sized that the FDA did not rely on the actual composition or use of the products. Id. at
1367. Rather, the FDA produced promotional flyers entitled "Cocaine," and other similar
vendor representations to demonstrate the vendor's intent to market the products as drugs.
Id. at 1366. Thus, while the FDA asserted that the products actually contained drug ingre-
dients, drug jurisdiction properly was based on the circumstances surrounding the sale of
the incense products. Id. at 1366-67. In its assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco, on the
other hand, the FDA's evidence focused upon the actual composition of tobacco products,
the effects of tobacco products on the body, and internal statements by individual tobacco
vendors. See supra notes 155-90 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA's analysis of
its tobacco jurisdiction).
236. See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text (comparing the FDA's classification
of tobacco products as medical devices to previous unreasonably broad product
classifications).
237. See generally 1 O'REILLY, supra note 4, § 18.02 (discussing device definitions and
providing examples of products regulated as medical devices).
238. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 28-30 (noting the FDA's ability to expand its juris-
diction arbitrarily through reinterpretation of the FDCA's definitional provisions); see also
infra notes 240-42 (discussing AMP and Bacto-Unidisk as examples of questionable juris-
dictional determinations).
239. See infra notes 271-89 and accompanying text (arguing that the FDA's jurisdic-
tional analysis is manifestly contrary to the FDCA).
240. See United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 785
(1969) (holding that a paper disk impregnated with antibiotics was a drug); AMP Inc. v.
Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir.) (holding that certain surgical supplies were drugs),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1968). The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 later over-
turned the drug classifications in Bacto-Unidisk and AMP. Medical Device Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 3(a)(1)(A), 90 Stat. 539, 575 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994)) (redefining "device"); see also supra notes 70-88 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Bacto-Unidisk, AMP, and the Medical Device Amendments).
241. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA's desire for
premarket approval authority over medical devices).
242. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 798-800; AMP, 389 F.2d at 829-30.
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Congress to intervene and enact the Medical Device Amendments.243
Similarly, Congress is certain to debate the issue of the FDA's tobacco
jurisdiction. 2 " Indeed, as little as five weeks after the FDA's jurisdic-
tional announcement, Senator Wendell Ford (D-Ky) introduced the To-
bacco Products Control Act of 1995, a bill that explicitly prohibits FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco.245 Regardless of the final legislative outcome,
congressional attention is the appropriate response to the FDA's charac-
terization of tobacco leaves and cigarettes as medical devices.246
IV. A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE FDCA OR JUST
BLOWING SMOKE?
The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products is controver-
sial because the Agency's action conflicts with the deeply rooted concept
that the executive branch should not define the limitations of the law
that it is entrusted to administer.247 Granted, Congress has delegated a
considerable amount of authority to the FDA, and that authority includes
the initial determination of a product's status as a "drug" or "device. 248
Nonetheless, it sometimes is necessary to examine whether the FDA has
crossed the sometimes hazy line between executing the intent of Con-
gress and exceeding the scope of delegated authority.249 Such an exami-
nation begins with the Chevron analysis.25 °
243. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing the "legal grey area"
between drugs and devices and the role it played in the Medical Device Amendments).
244. Cf. Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting swift congressional reaction to a holding that the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission possessed jurisdiction over cigarettes).
245. S. 1262, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 906 (1995). Section 906 states that "[niothing in
this Act or any other Act shall provide the [FDA] with any authority to regulate in any
manner tobacco or tobacco products." Id.
246. See Stephen Weitzman, supra note 79, at 336-41 (concluding that congressional
intervention was warranted following the Bacto-Unidisk and AMP decisions).
247. See Sunstein, supra note 108, at 2077 (setting forth constitutional considerations
that administrative interpretations of enabling acts implicate).
248. See supra note 4 (discussing the primary jurisdiction doctrine).
249. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (finding that congressional intent is the first and key inquiry in judicial
review of an administrative agency's interpretation of its enabling act).
250. Id. At least one commentator has speculated as to whether Chevron deference
should apply to an administrative agency's determination of its own jurisdiction. See Sun-
stein, supra note 108, at 2097 (questioning whether Chevron deference should apply when
an administrative agency seeks to extend its jurisdiction to a broad area of regulation); see
also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) (holding that the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act did not empower the Secretary of Labor to
determine the scope of remedies available under the Act). Compare Dole v. United Steel-
workers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 53 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron
deference applies to an agency's interpretation that affects its jurisdiction) and Mississippi
1032
1996] FDA's Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Tobacco 1033
A. Congress Has Spoken on the Issue of the FDA's Jurisdiction
Over Tobacco
In the first step of the Chevron analysis, a reviewing court must deter-
mine whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." '251 In two respects, congressional intent regarding the FDA's juris-
diction to regulate tobacco products is clear. First, Congress has refused
to pass proposed amendments that would have expressly brought tobacco
within the FDA's jurisdiction.252 Second, Congress enacted a compre-
hensive regulatory framework designed to address the relationship be-
tween smoking and health.253
Over the years, several bills have been introduced for the purpose of
extending FDA jurisdiction to tobacco products; all have failed.2 54 Inter-
estingly, most of the failed bills were strikingly similar to the FDA's cur-
rent legal analysis and regulatory proposals.255 For example, most of the
attempted amendments created a separate chapter for tobacco products,
rather than allowing the FDA to regulate tobacco pursuant to its drug
authorities.256 Both the drafters of the failed amendments and the FDA
recognized that regulation pursuant to FDCA drug authorities would
Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (same) with id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron def-
erence is inapplicable to agency interpretations affecting the scope of agency jurisdiction)
and New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1362-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989).
251. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
252. See, e.g., S. 2298, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (attempting to amend the FDCA to
grant the FDA express jurisdiction over tobacco products); H.R. 4350, 102 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) (providing the House version of S. 2298); S. 769, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (at-
tempting to amend the FDCA to grant the FDA express jurisdiction over tobacco prod-
ucts); H.R. 1494, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (providing the House version of S. 769); H.R.
3294, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (attempting to amend the FDCA to grant the FDA
express jurisdiction over tobacco products).
253. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994)); Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994)); see also supra notes 118-35 and accom-
panying text (surveying federal regulation of tobacco products).
254. See supra note 252 (listing unenacted amendments to FDCA).
255. See H.R. 4350, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (attempting to amend the FDCA to
grant the FDA express jurisdiction over tobacco products). Significantly, both the pro-
posed amendments and the FDA's current analysis incorporated findings that nicotine is a
harmful and addictive drug. Id. § 2(5); Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra
note 9, at 41,470.
256. E.g., H.R. 4350, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(11), (1992) (creating a separate chapter
for tobacco products in a proposed amendment to the FDCA).
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compel the banning of tobacco products257 -a politically undesirable so-
lution. Further, most of the failed amendments attempted to prevent to-
bacco use by young people, and most contained provisions severely
restricting the promotion of tobacco products as a means to this end.258
Admittedly, it is risky to assign interpretive weight to failed amend-
ments.259 Congress refuses to pass bills for many reasons, some of which
may be substantively unrelated to the bills at issue.2 6 ° In addition, com-
mittee reports, the most reliable indicia of congressional intent, did not
accompany the failed bills.26' Consequently, the other proferable evi-
dence demonstrating that Congress has spoken on the issue of FDA to-
bacco jurisdiction-the current regulatory framework dealing with the
relationship between tobacco and health-is an essential piece of the
puzzle in determining congressional intent.
In two major enactments designed to deal with the relationship be-
tween tobacco and health, the FCLAA262 and the CSTHEA,263 Congress
intended to establish a comprehensive federal program, thus preempting
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco.264 First, the plain language of both stat-
257. See id. In the findings section of H.R. 4350, Congress recognized that "creation of
a separate chapter for tobacco under the [FDCA] assures the most effective means of regu-
lating the product without the product being banned." Id.
258. See H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, (1989) (naming the Act the "Protect our
Children from Cigarettes Act of 1989").
259. See GEORGE A. COSTELLO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SOURCES OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY As AIDS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 53 (1989) (stating that
congressional inaction is not necessarily entitled to interpretational weight).
260. Id.
261. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legisla-
tive History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 42-43 (finding that the United States Supreme Court relies
upon committee reports more frequently than other forms of legislative history). It is not
surprising that the unenacted bills lacked committee explanation; committee reports usu-
ally are generated only when bills are reported to the Senate or House floor for action.
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 217-18 (1995).
262. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-
1341 (1994)).
263. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4401-
4408 (1994)).
264. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (stating the purpose of the FCLAA); id. § 1334 (pre-
empting federal and state action regarding statements on cigarette packages); id. § 4406(a)
(preempting federal action regarding statements on any package or advertisement of a
smokeless tobacco product); cf. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews, 435 F. Supp. 5,
12-13, 17 (1976) (noting, in a jurisdictional conflict between the BATF and the FDA, that
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act is special legislation designed to deal with the
alcoholic beverage industry, and holding that the BATF has exclusive jurisdiction to regu-
late the labeling of alcoholic beverages).
FDA's Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Tobacco
utes carves out specific roles for the FTC.2 6 5 Indeed, both statutes pur-
port neither to expand nor to limit the FTC's jurisdiction with respect to
the false or misleading advertising of cigarettes. 266 If Congress had so
desired, it could have made a similar statement relating to FDA jurisdic-
tion; the fact that it did not do so suggests that Congress did not believe
that tobacco products fell within FDA jurisdiction.267 Second, the legisla-
tive history of both statutes demonstrates that Congress focused on the
problem of tobacco use by young people, and intended the regulatory
framework to address that problem.2 68 Finally, both statutes reveal that
Congress intended to avoid the undesirable effects of diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing federal regulations.269 The FDA's proposed
regulations would frustrate this explicit congressional intent.27°
B. An Unreasonable Interpretation
If congressional intent regarding FDA jurisdiction over tobacco is un-
ambiguous, any judicial inquiry must end. 271' Even if reasonable minds
could differ, however, as to whether Congress has spoken on this issue,
the FDA's jurisdictional determination could not survive judicial review
under the second step of the Chevron framework.272 In other words, the
FDA's decision to assert jurisdiction over tobacco is not based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.273
By creating statutory definitions of "drug" and "device," Congress ex-
pressly delegated authority to the FDA to interpret those provisions
265. See id. § 1336 (providing authority for the FTC in the FCLAA); id. § 4407 (requir-
ing reports from HHS and the FTC in the CSTHEA); see also supra notes 118-35 and
accompanying text (discussing roles of several federal agencies in tobacco regulation).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1336 (1994) (providing the FTC's authority under the FCLAA); id.
§ 4404(c) (providing the FTC's authority under the CSTHEA).
267. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236,241-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(citing congressional acquiescence to the lack of FDA tobacco jurisdiction as a basis for
upholding the FDA's refusal to regulate cigarettes as drugs).
268. See H.R. REP. No. 449. supra note 126, at 4 reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2353
(noting the problem of cigarette advertising that appeals to young people); S. REP. No.
209, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7, 9 (noting the popular-
ity of smokeless tobacco among young people).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2)(B) (1994); see id. § 4406(a) (expressly preempting federal ef-
forts to require statements on cigarette packages).
270. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (describing proposed regulations
for tobacco products).
271. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
272. See id. (setting forth Chevron's second step).
273. See id. at 843-44.
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through the regulatory process. 274 Under Chevron's second step, courts
must uphold such regulations unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. '275 The FDA's determination that to-
bacco products properly are regulated as medical devices must fail, how-
ever, because it is manifestly contrary to the FDCA.276 Simply put, the
FDA's determination will require the Agency to depart from its statutory
mandate, leading to results that conflict with the FDCA's new drug au-
thorities and safety and efficacy requirements.277
First, the FDA's proposal failed to regulate nicotine as a drug, illustrat-
ing one contrary outcome of the FDA's jurisdictional analysis. 278 The
bulk of over 600 pages of evidence and analysis is dedicated to detailing
the delivery mechanisms and dangers of nicotine.279 Furthermore, nico-
tine is essential to the FDA's finding of statutory intent to affect the struc-
ture or any function of the body.28 ° The FDA even concluded that
nicotine is a "drug., 281 Despite the attention the FDA gave to nicotine's
drug status, however, the Agency still chose to regulate tobacco products
pursuant to the Act's device authorities.282 In effect, the Agency has con-
tended that it may declare a product a "drug," but then choose the statu-
tory provisions that best suit its regulatory preferences. 283 Because the
274. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (discussing the congressional practice of leaving
statutory "gaps" for an administrative agency to fill).
275. See id. at 844 (explaining that a regulation will not be given controlling weight if it
is manifestly contrary to the enabling statute).
276. See infra notes 278-89 and accompanying text (explaining why the FDA's current
tobacco analysis is manifestly contrary to the structure of the FDCA).
277. See infra notes 278-89 and accompanying text.
278. See Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,521-25 (conclud-
ing that nicotine is a "drug," but maintaining that regulation of nicotine is discretionary);
id. at 41,523 (choosing to regulate tobacco products as medical devices).
279. See id. at 41,453-87 (presenting a legal analysis of tobacco jurisdiction and formal
findings regarding tobacco products); id. apps. (comprising 312 pages of background
materials in a separate volume to supplement the federal register documents).
280. Id. at 41,521; see id. at 41,467-70 (describing the effects of tobacco on the structure
and function of the body solely by reference to nicotine).
281. Id. at 41,523.
282. Id. Undoubtedly, the FDA wished to avoid regulating nicotine as a drug because
that would lead to the removal of nicotine from the market. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)
(requiring FDA to remove new drugs from the market unless such drugs are safe and
effective); Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,523-24 (acknowl-
edging that regulation of nicotine as a drug could lead to its prohibition).
283. Granted, the FDA has a great deal of discretion in choosing its regulatory tech-
niques. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (noting that the FDA's mission to
protect the public health entitles it to a considerable amount of judicial deference). None-
theless, the FDA abused its discretion when it attempted to issue regulations that contra-
dict its quintessential mission-to assure the safety and efficacy of drugs and devices. See
supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the safety and efficacy requirements).
The FDA's proposed tobacco regulations do not attempt to ensure the safety or efficacy of
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FDA contended that nicotine is the root of the tobacco problem, a logical
regulatory scheme would classify nicotine as a "new drug" subject to the
FDA's approval power.284
The second contrary result of the FDA's proposal, involving the safety
and efficacy requirement, is closely related to the first. A major purpose
of the FDCA is to ensure that drugs and medical devices are safe and
effective for their intended uses.28 5 Furthermore, the FDCA requires the
tobacco products. Rather, the proposed regulations intend to decrease the number of to-
bacco users. See Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,785-87 (pro-
viding regulatory objectives). While this noble goal certainly is related to the public health,
the safety and efficacy requirements demonstrate that it is not the sort of situation that
Congress intended the FDCA to address. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
Thus, assuming that the FDA sustained its burden of proving vendor intent, a significant
assumption, the natural result of FDA tobacco jurisdiction would be an examination of
tobacco's safety and efficacy under the Act's new drug authorities. See 21 U.S.C. § 355
(1994) (describing the approval process for new drugs); id. § 321(p) (defining the term
"new drug" to include drugs "not generally recognized ... as safe and effective").
An example illustrates the point. The FDA recently asserted jurisdiction. to regulate
over-the-counter (OTC) products labelled as smoking deterrents. 21 C.F.R. § 310.544(a)
(1995). In its regulations, the FDA first noted that products claiming to " 'stop or reduce
the cigarette urge'" were drugs. Id. Second, the FDA declared that such products often
contain cloves, coriander, ginger, licorice root extract, and other commonly available ingre-
dients. Id. Nonetheless, the FDA concluded that the lack of data regarding the safety and
efficacy of such ingredients for OTC uses indicated that OTC smoking deterrent products
containing these ingredients were not "generally recognized as safe and effective." Id.
Consequently, OTC smoking deterrent products containing these common ingredients
would violate the FDCA, absent an approved new drug application. Id. § 310.544(b). The
Agency's cautious handling of ginger, cloves, and other spices advertised as smoking deter-
rents demonstrates the appropriate regulatory approach under the FDCA: the FDA con-
nected the product's drug status to the vendor's claimed intent to affect a structure or
function of the body, and the Agency attempted to ensure the product's safety and
effectiveness.
284. See supra note 26 (describing the FDA's new drug authority). This result also
would be consistent with the SMDA, which provides that a combination product's status
should be determined by its "primary mode of action." 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) (1994); see
supra note 93 (describing the SMDA and the FDA's Intercenter Agreement regarding
combination products). Additionally, classification of nicotine as a "new drug" would be
more consistent with the FCLAA, the CSTHEA, and the FDCA's restricted device au-
thorities. See supra note 193 (describing the FDA's authority to regulate advertising of
restricted devices). The FDA, by classifying tobacco products as restricted devices,
claimed the authority to regulate tobacco advertising. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) (1994) (pro-
viding FDA authority to regulate advertising of restricted devices). Significantly, when
Congress granted the authority to regulate restricted device advertising to the FDA, it
expressly removed that authority from the FTC's jurisdiction. See supra note 193 (explain-
ing Congress' decision to remove the jurisdiction to regulate restricted device advertising
from the FTC). If tobacco products were indeed restricted devices, the FTC's authority to
regulate tobacco advertising pursuant to the FCLAA and the CSTHEA would be in doubt.
See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text (describing the FTC's authority to regulate
tobacco advertising).
285. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994) (providing that all new drugs must be safe and effective); id.
360c (requiring devices to be safe and effective).
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FDA to ban products that cannot reasonably meet this statutory bur-
den.286 The FDA maintains that, in the case of tobacco products, the
safety requirement is a discretionary measure that it may address with a
"staged, multi-tiered approach., 287 Tobacco products, however, are abso-
lutely unsafe when used as intended.288 Thus, the FDA's interpretation
clearly is contrary to the FDCA, especially in light of the profound health
consequences of tobacco.289
C. An Issue for Congress
Tobacco products are a cultural tradition,290 an economic success,291
and a health disaster.292 In addition, tobacco products do not fit neatly
within the FDCA's framework.293 Therefore, cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products present the FDA with a difficult dilemma: forego regu-
lation and await clear direction from Congress, or creatively interpret the
FDCA to allow jurisdiction. Because tobacco products are truly unique,
the FDA should not attempt to force the issue of tobacco regulation
under the current version of the FDCA. If further regulation of tobacco
is desirable under the FDCA, Congress should create a separate chapter
for tobacco products.294
A separate chapter for tobacco products would allow Congress to ad-
dress the unique problems that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco pres-
ent.295  Indeed, only congressional action could retain the essential
elements of the FDA's current proposal without changing the meaning of
286. Id. §§ 355, 360c.
287. Analysis Regarding Agency Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 41,523-24.
288. See id. at 41,523-24 (recognizing that tobacco products are unsafe).
289. Id.; see MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY REP., supra note 15, at 645-49 (esti-
mating that cigarette smoking is responsible for over 400,000 deaths each year).
290. See SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 14, at 23-49 (describing
the emergence of the cigarette and use of tobacco products in general from 1534 to the
modern day).
291. See id. at 115-36 (describing the economic factors related to tobacco consumption
in the Americas).
292. See id. at 61-97 (describing the prevalence of tobacco consumption and associated
mortality rates).
293. See supra notes 201-89 accompanying text (describing the ways in which the
FDA's tobacco jurisdiction conflicts with the current version of the FDCA).
294. See, e.g., H.R. 4350, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (attempting to amend the FDCA
to grant the FDA express jurisdiction over tobacco). This was exactly the approach taken
by the failed amendments to the FDCA that expressly would have granted the FDA the
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. Id. § 5. Indeed, these amendments even created separate
misbranding and adulteration provisions for tobacco products, thus recognizing the unique
features of tobacco products. Id.
295. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text (discussing the historical, cultural,
economical, and public health aspects of tobacco use).
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the FDCA's safety and efficacy requirements. 296 In addition, the sepa-
rate chapter approach would benefit the regulated industry, the FDA,
and the public. First, clear direction from Congress would afford cer-
tainty for the tobacco industry.297 Under the FDA's current proposal, the
Agency retains the authority to subject tobacco products to any or all of
its drug and device provisions, including its premarket approval author-
ity.298 Second, the separate chapter approach, which would require ex-
press congressional approval, might enhance the availability of Agency
resources to enforce tobacco regulations.299  Finally, the process of
amending the Act would provide more meaningful opportunities for pub-
lic participation than notice and comment rulemaking.300
296. The FDA's jurisdictional analysis, if successful, would set a dangerous precedent
by changing the meaning of the safety and efficacy requirements. See supra notes 283-89
(arguing that the FDA's assertion of tobacco jurisdiction contradicted its quintessential
mission to ensure reasonably safe and effective drugs and devices).
297. The scope of the FDA's proposed regulatory scheme is uncertain. On the one
hand, the proposed regulations outline the planned restrictions on the advertising and dis-
tribution of tobacco products explicitly. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text
(describing proposed regulations). On the other hand, the FDA also notes that tobacco
products, as "devices," will be subject to "pre-existing requirements" in the Act and the
regulations. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, at 41,352. These requirements include
general device labelling requirements, 21 C.F.R. pt. 801 (1995), registration requirements,
id. pt. 807 (1995), and good manufacturing practice requirements, id. pt. 820. Additionally,
the Agency's proposal would permit it to subject tobacco products to its new drug author-
ity, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994), or its authority to ban devices that present an "unreasonable
and substantial risk of illness," id. § 360f(a)(1). Thus, the Agency's current proposal con-
stitutes only a fraction of the potential regulatory scheme.
298. See supra note 297 (discussing the scope of the potential regulatory scheme for
tobacco products).
299. The FDA's current proposal did not include an estimate of administrative costs.
See Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, at 41,365-68 (describing "regulatory costs" with-
out reference to cost to the FDA). However, in response to congressional inquiries, the
FDA estimated the cost of tobacco-related work to require about $3.5 million and 27 full-
time employees in fiscal year 1995. Letters from Diane E. Thompson, Associate Commis-
sioner for Legislative Affairs, FDA, to the Honorable Mitch McConnell, United States
Senate, and the Honorable Joe Skeen, Chairman, Subcommittee on Agriculture, United
States House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1996). Accordingly, the FDA's tobacco effort is
certain to divert funding from other Agency responsibilities, such as the drug approval
process. See Ellen McCleskey, FDA: Budget, Election Pressures Could Delay Agency Re-
form in 1996; Gingrich a Factor, 4 Health Care Pol'y Daily (BNA) No. 5, at 159, 159-61
(1996) (noting that FDA insiders are troubled by the FDA's decision to commit Agency
resources to tobacco regulation). If Congress amended the FDCA to grant express to-
bacco jurisdiction, however, the Agency would be in a better position to request additional
resources. Even with express authority, of course, political realities often render such
budget matters uncertain.
300. See E. Donald Elliot, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 1992 DUKE L.J. 1490. Professor
Elliot asserts that notice-and-comment rulemaking is an ineffective formality:
No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki
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V. CONCLUSION
Tobacco products exert a tremendous toll on the health of the nation.
The FDA, recognizing the health consequences associated with tobacco
use, has asserted jurisdiction over tobacco products with a commendable
goal in mind: a reduction of the number of tobacco users under eighteen
years of age. The FDA's legal analysis of its jurisdiction, however, is
problematic in several respects. First, Congress did not intend for the
FDA to regulate tobacco. This intention was expressed explicitly through
failed attempts to amend the FDCA to grant tobacco jurisdiction, and
through a comprehensive federal tobacco regulatory scheme that did not
create a role for the FDA. Second, even if Congress has not spoken di-
rectly on the issue of the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco, the FDA's
interpretation of the FDCA as allowing jurisdiction over tobacco prod-
ucts cannot pass judicial muster. Indeed, the FDA's jurisdictional inter-
pretation is manifestly contrary to FDCA organization and precedent.
Executive branch agencies, such as the FDA, derive their power by con-
gressional mandate. Unreasonably broad interpretations of statutory def-
initions defy congressional intent. Thus, if the FDA is to regulate tobacco
products as drugs or devices under the FDCA, it is for Congress, and not
the FDA, to make this determination.
Ann Mileur Boeckman
theatre is to human passions - a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal
way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues.
Id. at 1492-93.
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